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ABSTRACT 
This capstone evaluates the capabilities and potential usefulness of a Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) system in the detection of malicious 
network activities. The emphasis of this project was to select and configure a Free and 
Open Source SIEM (FOSS) to perform automated detection and alerting of malicious 
network events based upon predefined indicators of compromise. To test these 
functionalities, a virtual lab network consisting of a combination of Windows servers and 
Windows and Linux workstations was built to provide a proof-of-concept environment 
for testing the chosen FOSS SIEM. From within the lab network, a series of malicious 
cyber actions were executed to evaluate how well our configured FOSS solution detected 
and reported them. As SIEM solutions are increasingly deployed to help automate cyber 
defense, we hope this study motivates the adoption of FOSS solutions by 
organizations that may not be able to afford a commercial solution, or—perhaps—
may simply prefer the advantages of free and open-source solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the world of information technology and cryptology, those who have worked in 
an Information Assurance (IA) or Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) position can 
attest to how strenuous and time consuming the process of identifying malicious cyber 
activities can be. Alerts generated by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) must be reviewed by a human to ensure their validity. This 
review often necessitates having to analyze system and event logs from multiple devices/
sources to identify correlations helpful in corroborating the alerts. This task can be very 
tedious depending on the size of the network, the number of security systems involved, the 
layers of defense-in-depth, and the specificity of the alert information provided. An alert 
generated by an IDS or IPS provides analysts with date/time and possibly the affected 
network or subnet information. This can help focus on specific systems and a timespan of 
logs to retrieve and review. Conversely, attempting to gather data on malicious activity 
undetected by antivirus, IDS, or IPS with no date/time and source information can render 
this task exponentially more difficult, as the absence of specific timeline information means 
that more logs will likely need to be analyzed. To mitigate this difficulty, a Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution ingests logs from various networks 
systems, such as routers, IDS, IPS, servers, clients, antivirus systems, and host-based 
security systems, thus easing the burden of having to navigate to numerous systems in 
search of event(s) that may be malicious in nature. A number of SIEM solutions are 
available, some proprietary and others open source. This capstone demonstrates how a free 
and open-source software (FOSS) SIEM can benefit the Navy without added materiel costs. 
It focuses on how a FOSS SIEM fed with appropriate system and application logs can be 
leveraged to help automate the detection of malicious cyber activity. A comparison of 
available FOSS SIEMs led to the selection of the Elastic Stack Log and Kibana (ELK) as 
the SIEM of focus in this capstone. 
2 
A. WHAT IS A SIEM? 
A SIEM (pronounced “sim”) is a software solution that provides security 
information and event management of system and security data from hosts and network 
devices. SIEMs are becoming increasingly popular in networks because of the growing 
importance of the capabilities they provide. Modern networks generate a plethora of 
information and logs that can potentially be valuable indicators of malicious cyber activity 
of interest to system administrators and security analysts. The full value of this information, 
however, can only be fully realized when it is readily available and properly presented to 
the interested party. The objective of a SIEM solution is to corral the heterogeneous 
information and event logs sourced from various devices within a network, and provide a 
common interface for viewing and analyzing that data. While many SIEMs also incorporate 
several additional features to provide unique capabilities that distinguish them from their 
competitors, the principal value-added of any SIEM is derived from its incorporation of 
several fundamental capabilities. These fundamental capabilities can generally be 
classified as log aggregation, log normalization, log correlation, alerting, and all-around 
log and alert management. Each of these capabilities will be elaborated upon in this report. 
B. EVENT LOGS 
Before discussing SIEM capabilities, one must first understand what event logs are. 
Event logs are the primary “product” consumed by a SIEM; they are the raw data a SIEM 
analyzes to glean meaningful correlations that—when significant—can yield usable 
intelligence regarding cyber threats and vulnerabilities. Almost every device on a network 
generates or can be configured to generate, some type of log. These logs come in a vast 
variety of formats depending on the type of device they were created from and how the 
manufacturer decided the logs should be formatted. Modern Microsoft Windows operating 
systems, for example, use a proprietary log format called EVTX, which is an update to 
Microsoft’s earlier EVT format. In [1], EVTX logs are stored in the extensible markup 
language (XML) format, which provides filtering granularity within Windows’ native 
Event Viewer, or when using a third-party application or SIEM. 
3 
One industry standard format for logs is “syslog,” or more specifically, the BSD 
syslog as defined by RFC3154. Syslog-style logs are standard across many platforms, 
including Cisco IOS devices, Palo-Alto Network’s PAN-OS, Linux, Unix, and a vast 
number of software solutions, including the Snort intrusion detection/prevention system 
and the PfSense firewall. The syslog standard is more than just a log format; it is also a 
transmission protocol for the delivery of logs. Syslogs are text-based logs that can be saved 
locally on the machine on which they are generated, but can also be transmitted (typically 
over UDP port 514) to a centralized syslog collector. 
Although vendors are free to use whichever logging format they choose, 
Microsoft’s EVTX format and the industry standard syslog format are generally the most 
common event log formats available. EVTX is not an industry standard log format; XML 
is, and it allows some level of interoperability of EVTX logs with other systems. Syslog’s 
ubiquity is in large part due to the fact syslog has become a widely used logging format on 
which logging devices and log collection systems depend for interoperability. One might 
consider syslog to be the least-common denominator of computer system log formats. 
C. AGGREGATION 
When using a SIEM, logs must be aggregated into one centralized location. This is 
typically accomplished by configuring the devices, or in some cases the log collection 
agents, to transport the logs to a central repository. The repository may store flat files or 
some type of database. The Securosis blog states not only does the centralized log 
repository allow for log consistency, it also allows for security and retention policies to be 
managed more easily, as all of the logs reside in a centralized location [2]. The resource 
requirements of the log repository depend upon the size of the network the SIEM is 
monitoring. As the number of aggregated logs increases, the storage capacity and 
computational demands on the log repository that warehouses these logs should also 
increase. It is therefore important to be able to calculate the amount of log data that will be 
generated. This can be accomplished using a historical baseline of events per second (EPS) 
metric. This metric can also serve as a performance rating for a SIEM (e.g., “our SIEM can 
process—with no bottlenecking—up to X EPS”), or as a licensing tool (e.g., “your SIEM 
4 
contract guarantees an EPS of no less than X”); so it is important to understand and take 
into consideration when choosing a SIEM solution. EPS, unsurprisingly, equates to the 
number of log events generated per second, but to use this equation to estimate the storage 
capacity of the repository, the size (in bytes) of each event must also be considered. 
Therefore, using the formula (Average EPS x Average Bytes Per Event / 1,000,000,000), 
we can determine the size of logs generated, on average, per second in gigabytes. 
Multiplying the result by 86,400 will give us the daily storage capacity in bytes needed for 
storing the logs. Multiplying the daily storage requirement by the number of days desired 
for retention will result in an estimate of the overall storage capacity requirements of an 
organization’s log repository. It is also important to consider that certain events or incidents 
may cause a spike in the EPS that could last from minutes to days. An increase in EPS 
means an increase in required storage capacity, so it is best to ensure the storage repository 
is large enough to handle such unforeseen spikes in log generation. 
D. NORMALIZATION  
After logs are aggregated, they must be normalized. While there are a handful of 
standard log formats, most information networks comprise systems, software, and 
applications from different manufacturers, and the logs that they generate are not all in the 
same format. Using the example of the date and time an event occurs for which a log entry 
is generated, a system may be configured to store logs with date in ddmmmyyyy format 
(06May2018) and time in 12-hour format (2:26:42 P.M. PST) and jointly categorize them 
as Date/Time. A second system may use the same format but separately categorize these 
two fields as Date and Timestamp. A third system may generate date in mm/dd/yy format 
(e.g., 05/06/18) and time in 12-hour format and jointly categorize them as Date/Time. A 
fourth system may generate date in mm/dd/yyyy format (05/06/2018) and time in 24-hour 
format (14:26:42 PST) and separately categorize them as Date and Timestamp. These are 
just a few examples that illustrate how quickly the variety of log formats can become large. 
If the organization operates in multiple geographic areas, things may become even more 
complicated owing to differing time zones and variations regarding the implementation of 
daylight saving adjustments. In France, for example, to represent 06 May 2018, the Day-
Month-Year format (06/05/2018 or 06/05/18) is used instead of Month-Day-Year (05/06/
5 
2018 or 05/06/18), and the time-zone shift from GMT (Greenwich Mean Time) is plus two 
hours, vice subtracting hours for time-zones in the Western Hemisphere countries. To 
further complicate things, the date that France transitions to daylight saving time is two 
weeks different from when most U.S. states transition. Log normalization is the process of 
converting such heterogeneous log data fields into a particular (homogeneous) format that 
the SIEM evaluation engine is designed to interpret. This process may be done via an agent 
or be agentless. “Normalization-using agents” means that the normalization software 
(agent) is installed either on a central log server or on every single security system that 
generates logs. In an agentless normalization scheme, systems generating alerts send logs 
within set time intervals to the SIEM to be locally normalized. 
E. CORRELATION 
Once logs are aggregated and normalized, they may be queried for more meaningful 
inferences that pertain to identifying threats or vulnerabilities. The ability to identify 
security-related events from a disparate number of systems in an autonomous network is 
the primary benefit of deploying a SIEM solution. In defensive cyberspace operations, 
when an incident occurs, security technicians must analyze logs from many levels, if not 
every level, of the defense-in-depth architecture so as to build a logical timeline of activities 
that might advance the who, what, when, where, why and how investigation of a cyber 
incident. A SIEM has the ability to sift through normalized logs from disparate systems on 
a network that were fed to its database and identify events that are mutually related. An 
event correlation may be as simple as tracking an IP address: a host is discovered with 
malware that beacons to an IP address associated with malicious activity; upon searching 
that IP address in the SIEM, it is revealed that many other hosts on that network are also 
infected with the same malware. The SIEM may correlate that same IP to other events 
leading to the discovery of more compromised assets. 
  
6 
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II. COMPARE AND CONTRAST OF OPEN-SOURCE SIEMS 
Following an online research on available FOSS SIEMs, we elected to review three 
of the most popular and discussed SIEM solutions: Prelude’s Universal Open-Source SIEM 
project, AlienVault’s Open Source Security Information and Event Management (OSSIM), 
and Elasticsearch Logstash and Kibana (ELK) by Elastic 
A. PRELUDE 
Prelude is a distributed universal SIEM that sorts and reports security-related events 
regardless of the system generating the events brand or license. Prelude Open Source SIEM 
(OSS) is the open-source version of the Prelude SIEM and is designed for evaluation, 
research and testing in small network infrastructures. Prelude OSS performance is lower 
compared to its enterprise version. 
1. Components 
There are several components that make up both Prelude OSS and Prelude SIEM. 
Table 1 lists these components and includes a description of each. 




A server that receives, manages, and saves alerts to a specified location (log 
file or database) and establishes priority of process according to criticality. 
Libprelude A secure library that is an Application Programming Interface (API) for 
communication with Prelude subsystems. It also provides the necessary 
functionality for generating and emitting IDMEF alerts. 
LibpreludeDB “An abstraction layer upon the type and format of the database used to store 
IDMEF alerts. [This] allows developers to use the IDMEF database 
efficiently without worrying about SQL.” 
Prelude-LML A log analyzer that allows for the collection and analysis of information 
from all sorts of applications emitting logs or syslog messages. 
Prelude-
Correlator 
A Python rules-based correlation engine able to connect and fetch alerts 
from a remote manager based on a provided ruleset. 
Prewikka Prelude’s official Graphical User Interface (GUI). In addition to facilitating 
analysts’ work, the GUI provides access to external tools such as whois and 
traceroute. 
8 
The open-source version of Prelude is equipped with an abbreviated version of the 
components that the commercial version comprises. Table 2 lists components of Prelude 
OSS and SIEM. 
Table 2. Prelude OSS vs. Prelude SIEM. Adapted from [4]. 
Versions Prelude OSS Prelude SIEM 
Standard IDMEF. IDMEF, IODEF. 
Alerting Simplified alert tray. Simplified & expert alert tray, 
many tools for alerts analysis and 
visualization. 
Correlation Simple correlation from 
Python scripts, deployment in 
the command line, 10 default 
rules. 
Correlation and performance from 
metalanguage, rules edition and 
deployment via the web-UI, 60 
default rules. 
Selection Rules edition via shell, regex 
and command line. 30 default 
equipment. 
Rules edition & deployment via the 
web-UI. 100 default equipment. 
Archiving Alert archiving only. Alert & log archiving in a NoSQL 
database, indexing and intuitive 
analysis interface. 
Analyze Alert tray filtering. Browsable graphs statistics, 
Forensic graphic, Reporting, 
Compliance management. 
Architecture Mono-server deployment. Multi-server architecture, relaying, 
high-availability, fail over. 
Rights Mono-user, no authentication. Multi-user, LDAP authentication, 
user-rights & profile management. 
Operating 
system 
Limited, many actions through 
“shell and command line.” 
Customized overview, 
Customizable dashboard, Integrated 
tickets management, Workflow and 
knowledge base, Multiple 
configuration web-UI. 
Performance Limited real-time processing 
capacity by a non-optimized 
database schema. Performance 
decreasing with the increase of 
archived alert volume. 
Millions alert notifications are 
possible in a day. Search time up to 




2. Offered Features  
In both versions of Prelude, security event logs are normalized to the Intrusion 
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF), a standard data format designed by the 
IETF under RFC 4765. IDMEF was developed with the intent to enable interoperability 
among commercial, open source, and research systems [5]. 
3. Ability to Integrate with Other Products  
Prelude is agentless; however, the following third-party agents are available [6]: 
• Auditd—the Linux Audit Deamon. 
• ufwi-filterd—for user-based addition to Netfilter, the IP filtering layer 
from the Linux Kernel. 
• LinuxPAM—“a system of libraries that handle authentication tasks” [6]. 
• Nepenthes—a versatile tool to collect malware. 
• OSSEC—“an open-source host-based IDS that performs log analysis, 
integrity checking, Windows registry monitoring, rootkit detection, real-
time alerting and active response” for all major operating systems [6]. 
• Samhain— “an open-source host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) 
for POSIX (Unix, Linux, Cygwin/Windows). [It] provides file integrity 
checking, as well as rootkit detection, port monitoring, detection of rogue 
SUID executables, and hidden processes” [6]. 
• SanCP—a network security tool designed to collect statistical information 
regarding network traffic. It records traffics in PCAP format for the 
purpose of auditing, historical analysis, and network activity discovery. 
• Snort—a defacto rule-driven open-source IDS. 
• Suricata—“a high-performance network IDS, IPS and network security 
monitoring engine” [6]. 
• Kismet—“an open-source wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion 
detection system” [6]. 
4. Minimum System Requirements 
Prelude OSS does not have explicitly stated system requirements. Considering that 
Prelude OSS can be installed on many different Linux distributions, the system 
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requirements would need to at least meet those which are specified by the host operating 
system. Although the system requirements for most Linux distributions are considerably 
less than modern consumer-grade hardware, the system requirements for Prelude OSS for 
use in a production environment would likely demand more modern and powerful 
hardware. 
5. Compatible Host OSes 
Prelude is supported for the following Linux distribution [7]: 
• Fedora/RedHat/CentOS(epel): Prelude OSS 4.1 
• Debian/Ubuntu: Prelude OSS 4.1 
• Gentoo: Prelude OSS 4.1 
• Mageia: Prelude OSS 4.1 
• Arch Linux: Prelude OSS 4.1 
• OpenSuse: Prelude OSS 4.0 (Update to 4.1 in progress) 
6. Ability to Generate Reports 
With logs stored in a centralized database, Prelude provides an easy generation of 
reports. It allows users to create and send reports in pdf format via email.  
7. Documentation  
Well-detailed documentation is available on the Prelude website 
(https://www.prelude-siem.org/projects/prelude/wiki) with details on its components, 
installation procedures, configuration, and optimization. 
B. OSSIM 
OSSIM is AlienVault’s open source version of AlienVault’s commercial SIEM: 
Unified Security Management (USM). The features available in OSSIM are more limited 
than what is included in USM. OSSIM is licensed under the GNU General Public License 
and is distributed as an installable ISO image. OSSIM uses Debian Linux as its host 
operating system and provides many of its features using preexisting standalone FOSS 
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components. The AlienVault tools that are part of OSSIM mostly provide log correlation 
and plugin integration. 
1. Components 
OSSIM consists of several components. Table 3 lists these components and 
includes a description of each. 
Table 3. OSSIM Components .Adapted from [8]. 
Components Descriptions 
OpenVAS Open Vulnerability Assessment: Vulnerability Scanner. 
Suricata A FOSS IDS and IPS. 
tcptrack Network sniffer. Displays the status of TCP connections. 
Nagios Network Monitoring Software. Provides monitoring of network 
services, system resources, and applications across all major 
operating systems 
OSSEC An “open-source host-based IDS that performs log analysis, 
integrity checking, Windows registry monitoring, rootkit detection, 
real-time alerting and active response” for all major operating 
systems [6]. 
Munin Network resource monitoring that provides network trend analysis. 
NFSen/NFDump NetFlow Sensor / NetFlowDump: Provides network flow statistics. 
FProbe NetFlow Probe: Collects network traffic data and sends the collected 
traffic as NetFlow flows to a collector. 
Excludes tools that are deprecated, phased out, or replaced. 
2. Offered Features 
OSSIM offers several capabilities but is still limited as compared to its commercial 
counterpart USM. The following list includes the capabilities included in OSSIM [9].  
• Asset Discovery and Inventory 
• Vulnerability Assessment 
• Intrusion Detection 
• Behavioral Monitoring 
• SIEM Event Correlation 
• Community Support via Product Forums 
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• Powered via Open Threat Exchange 
3. Ability to Integrate with Other Products and Systems 
OSSIM can collect data from many sources. OSSIM provides agents that run on 
Windows and Linux that can be used to send collected data to the SIEM. Other systems 
that generate logs in various standard formats are also supported. According to FIWARE, 
OSSIM supports the following log data types [10]. 
• Syslog (supported log format by most systems and network devices) 
• SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) 
• Osiris (Unix HIDS) 
• Snare (Windows log agent) 
The ability to ingest Syslog logs provides OSSIM with the widest support for other 
systems and devices. AlienVault states that many devices, including the following, can be 
integrated with OSSIM either via the syslog protocol or via plugins [11]. 
• Brocade routers and switches 
• Cisco PIX and ASA firewalls 
• Cisco Unified Communications Manager 
• Check Point firewall 
• Palo Alto PAN-OS 
• Symantec Endpoint Management 
• VMWare vCenter 
4. Minimum System Requirements 
The system requirements for OSSIM are largely dependent upon usage. On a large 
network with many log sources, the hardware requirements required for installation may 
be far less than what is required for operation. Table 4 represents the minimum 
recommended system requirements for installation in a production environment, although 
there are countless reports online of successful installations with far less system resources. 
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Table 4. OSSIM System Requirements. Adapted from [12], [13]. 
 Bare Metal [12] Virtual Machine [13] 
CPU Intel Xeon E5620 8 cores 
RAM 16 GB (DDR3 1333 MHz) 16 GB 
Storage 1 TB (SAS 10000 RPM) 1 TB 
 
5. Compatible Host OS 
The only host OS supported by OSSIM is Debian Linux. OSSIM is provided as an 
ISO image that installs Debian Linux along with OSSIM and all included software 
packages. The latest version of OSSIM runs on Debian Linux version 8. 
6. Ability to Generate Reports 
OSSIM provides several report types downloadable as PDFs. Reports can also be 
sent via email from within OSSIM. The default time period for reports is 30 days, but this 
is customizable. According to [14], report types include Alarms (top threat information), 
Business & Compliance ISO PCI (provides required information based on compliance 
regulations), Geographic (based on configured geolocation of assets), SIEM events, and 
Tickets (lists and describes tickets created from alarms). 
7. Documentation 
Documentation for OSSIM is considerably sparse as AlienVault maintains 
documentation for its commercial SIEM only. USM includes many features not available in 
OSSIM. Much of the information needed to deploy and operate OSSIM must be culled 
together from the AlienVault forums and third-party guidance from various webpages. The 
lack of a central repository of OSSIM documentation provides a major hurdle for a technician 
deploying OSSIM, and is the source of many complaints within the AlienVault forums. 
C. ELK 
By itself, ELK is technically not a (full-service) SIEM, but merely a log aggregation 
and management solution. However, when combined with OSSEC (the HIDS component 
included in both Prelude and OSSIM), ELK functionality is enhanced to meet the 
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definitional requirements of a SIEM. Security Onion is a network security monitoring 
solution distributed as an installable ISO image of Ubuntu Linux. When augmented with 
ELK, OSSEC, and many other optional tools, Security Onion encompasses much more 
security functionality than any SIEM alone typically provides. We will be considering 
Security Onion as a platform for hosting our SIEM tools as it comes preloaded with tools 
such as ELK and OSSEC. The scope of our consideration of Security Onion will be based 
on its SIEM specific tools only. 
1. Components 
Table 5 lists components of Security Onion. 
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Table 5. Security Onion Components 
Components Descriptions 
Elasticsearch A distributed, RESTful and analytical engine used as the heart of the 
Elastic Stack to centrally store data and discover expected and 
unexpected information. 
Logstash A “server-side data processing pipeline that ingests data from a 
multitude of sources simultaneously, transforms it, and sends it to your 
favorite ‘stash’” [16]. 
Kibana A visualization plugin for Elasticsearch that provides visual capabilities 
on top of contents indexed on the Elasticsearch cluster. It allows analysts 
to create bar, line, and scatter plots and/or pie charts. 
OSSEC An “open-source host-based IDS that performs log analysis, integrity 
checking, Windows registry monitoring, rootkit detection, real-time 
alerting and active response” for all major operating systems [6]. 
Suricata A FOSS IDS and IPS. 
Bro A “powerful network analysis framework that is much different from the 
typical IDS… Bro provides a comprehensive platform for more general 
network traffic analysis” [19]. 
Sguil “An intuitive GUI that provides access to real-time events, session data, 
and raw packet captures. [It] facilitates the practice of network security 
monitoring and event-driven analysis” [20]. 
Squert “A web application used to query and view event data stored in a Sguil 
database (typically IDS alert data). [It] is a visual tool that provides 
additional context to events through the use of metadata, time series 
representations and weighted and logically grouped result sets” [21]. 
Excludes tools that are not SIEM-related, deprecated, being phased out or replaced. 
Adapted from [6], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], and [21]. 
 
2. Offered Features 
The Logstash pipeline process comprises three processing stages: Inputs, Filters, 
and Outputs. Inputs are composed of events generated by input sources. These events are 
then filtered for usefulness and correlation. And, finally, the selected (passing the filters) 
events are sent as outputs to a database store. 
During Inputs, Logstash reads files from a file system and listens for syslog-
formatted logs which are parsed using the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) Syslog 
protocol. According to [22], the BSD Syslog protocol is defined in RFC 3164 as a “protocol 
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that provides transport to allow a machine to send event notification messages across IP 
networks to event message collectors—also known as syslog servers.” 
Logstash can be conditionally configured for specific action on events during the 
Filters stage. Unstructured log data can be parsed into queryable format, a process known 
as grokking. Event fields may be mutated (renamed, replaced, or modified) or dropped 
entirely if not desired or prone to cause issues in Elasticsearch. Users may also configure 
the filters stage to clone (copy) events or add geo-location information in the form of IP 
addresses, a concept known as geoip. 
Last, the Output stage defines where event logs will be shipped. Logs may be sent 
to Elasticsearch to allow for convenience in future queries or saved directly to disk as a 
file. Alternatively, logs may be sent to a tool called graphite, which allows for metrics 
building, or sent to statsd. According [23], statsd is a service that listens for statistics such 
as timers and counters and allows the data to be plugged into various backend services. 
3. Ability to Integrate with Other Products and Systems 
ELK can be integrated with many products that allow for a wide range of 
configuration management options and log input sources. According to Logz.io, ELK can 
be easily installed inside a Docker container for portability and isolation. Also, 
configuration management tools such as Ansible, Puppet, and Chef can be used to automate 
ELK deployment [24]. Using input plugins, ELK can also receive many input sources that 
provide ELK the ability to integrate with many other products. Table 6 lists some of the 
popular ELK input plugins and what input source they enable ELK to receive. 
Table 6. ELK Input Sources. Adapted from [25]. 
Plugin Description 
azure_event_hubs Receives events from Azure Event Hubs. 
beats Receives events from the Elastic Beats framework. 
cloudwatch Pulls events from the Amazon Web Services CloudWatch 
Application Programming Interface. 
elasticsearch Reads query results from an Elasticsearch cluster. 
exec Captures the output of a shell command as an event. 
file Streams events from files. 
17 
Plugin Description 
github Reads events from a GitHub webhook. 
http Receives events over HTTP or HTTPS. 
imap Reads mail from an Internet Message Access Protocol server. 
jdbc Creates events from Java Database Connectivity data. 
pipe Streams events from a long-running command pipe. 
rss Captures the output of command line tools as an event. 
s3 Streams events from files in an Amazon S3 bucket. 
snmptrap Creates events based on Simple Network Management 
Protocol trap messages. 
syslog Reads syslog messages as events. 
unix Reads events over a UNIX socket. 
 
4. Minimum System Requirements 
The minimum system requirements for running ELK within Security Onion are a 
64-bit architecture, 4 CPU cores, 8 GB of RAM, and adequate storage based on the EPS of 
the network being monitored. Local solid-state storage is recommended over mechanical 
storage and network-attached storage such as iSCSI or Fibre Channel. However, when 
running in a testbed environment, mechanical or network-attached storage will suffice. 
5. Compatible Host OS 
ELK can be installed on most Linux distributions and is also supported on the latest 
Windows operating systems. In theory, a highly experienced system administrator could 
get a SIEM based on ELK and OSSEC installed and functioning on either Linux or 
Windows. Security Onion removes the need for installation, customization, and integration 
with other tools by bundling all necessary components into an installable Linux 
distribution. The latest version of Security Onion is based on Ubuntu Linux version 14.04. 
6. Ability to Generate Reports 
Using Kibana, reports can be generated and exported as a PDF file. The reports 
reflect only the data presented in the Kibana Dashboard. Kibana Dashboards are created 
by combining Kibana visualizations based on log field data. Because Kibana supports 
customizable dashboards based on log fields, any logged data can be visualized through 
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Kibana. Although there may not be preconfigured reports, the customizability of Kibana 
Dashboard provides endless possibilities in data reporting. 
7. Documentation 
Security Onion provides extensive documentation on the use of ELK, OSSEC, and 
essentially all the tools included in Security Onion needed for a SIEM. Documentation on 
ELK, OSSEC, and many other tools is also available from each tool’s respective 
homepage. Security Onion’s popularity has resulted in a plethora of guidance throughout 
the web and within several published books, such as Applied Network Security Monitoring: 
Collection, Detection, and Analysis by Chris Sanders, and The Practice of Network 
Security Monitoring: Understanding Incident Detection and Response by Richard Bejtlich. 
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III. CHOSEN SIEM 
Upon evaluating each SIEM solution, we determined that as compared to Prelude 
and OSSIM, ELK, along with the other SIEM tools included in Security Onion, are better 
suited for the intent of our capstone. Although many of the features across the evaluated 
SIEMs were comparable, the determination to use ELK was made based on two primary 
factors: features and documentation. 
We believe that with regard to features, ELK is the better choice as all features are 
available without the need to purchase a license. We noticed that the FOSS versions of 
Prelude and OSSIM were limited in their features. To use all features available in Prelude 
and OSSIM, a licensed version must be purchased. Prelude OSS is a lower-performance 
version of the licensed Prelude SIEM and is designed for testing in a small network 
infrastructure. Though OSSIM is not described as a lower-performance version of USM (the 
licensed and full version), it lacks the ability to perform log management and to integrate 
with third-party ticketing applications such as JIRA. Unlike Prelude and OSSIM, ELK is a 
FOSS solution for which the full version is available for download. In contrasting the feature 
sets available in our chosen SIEMs, ELK with Security Onion provides many more features 
and capabilities than the free versions of Prelude and OSSIM. Due to the consideration of 
licensing and features, ELK stands out as the superior SIEM choice. 
We believe the ubiquitous documentation on ELK and the tools included in Security 
Onion make it a more easily adoptable SIEM. Availability of documentation was an 
important factor in choosing a SIEM as we want to ensure the capability can be easily 
adopted. We found the documentation of OSSIM to be severely lacking as compared to 
Prelude and ELK. The Need to derive guidance and information on OSSIM from 
AlienVault’s USM, third-party websites, and forums was challenging and presents a barrier 
for easy adoption of OSSIM. For the reason of lack of quality documentation, we eliminated 
OSSIM from further consideration. The documentation for Prelude and ELK was far more 
extensive and well organized. Although both Prelude and ELK had quality documentation 
specifically from their vendors, we found much more third-party documentation for ELK in 
general and ELK’s use within Security Onion. There are countless third-party webpages, 
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whitepapers, and books discussing how to use ELK as a SIEM. Because of the extensive 
documentation and the vast suite of tools, ELK with Security Onion provide an easily 
adoptable and powerful SIEM solution. 
Since we have elected to use ELK within the Security Onion Linux distribution, 
leveraging various security tools it has to offer, it is essential that we talk about what Security 
Onion provides. There are many SIEM solutions available for use in monitoring and 
protecting networks; however, there is not a single best solution for all networks. Security 
Onion provides a package of network monitoring tools that network administrators and 
security experts can choose from and configure to meet their specific network security needs.  
Tools that comprise Security Onion may be categorized into three core components: 
packet capture, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and Host-based Intrusion 
Detection Systems (HIDS), and network analysis tools. 
A. PACKET CAPTURE 
Full packet capture in Security Onion is accomplished using Netsniff-ng, a sniffing 
toolkit that captures packets seen by Security Onion sensors on inbound and outbound 
traffics. This open-source toolkit is able to perform online and offline analysis of captured 
packets. Captured packets are saved to disk, and pcap format is supported for analysis via 
Wireshark. Sniffing tools are often placed on mirroring switch ports capturing and storing 
data that can be relevant during preliminary and in-depth analysis. The following utilities 
make up the Netsniff-ng toolkit [26]: 
• Netsniff-ng: “a fast zero-copy analyzer, pcap capturing and replaying tool” 
[26]. 
• Trafgen: “a multithreaded low-level zero-copy network packet generator” 
[26]. 
• Mausezahn: a high-level packet generator for hardware and software 
appliances with Cisco Command Line Interface (CLI). 
• BPFC: “a Berkeley Packet Filter compiler, Linux BPF JIT disassembler” 
[26]. 
• IFPPS: “a kernel networking statistics tool” [26]. 
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• Flowtop: a network filter connection tracking tool. 
• Curvetu: a lightweight curve25519-based IP tunnel. 
• ASTraceroute: a traceroute utility. 
B. NIDS AND HIDS 
As their names indicate, a Network IDS monitors network traffic while a Host-based 
IDS monitors activities internal to a host. A NIDS may be rule-based where traffic is analyzed 
based on applied signatures, or anomaly based where traffic analysis consists of a comparison 
against known good baseline(s). Security Onion provides the option of either Snort and 
Suricata as rule-based NIDS or Bro IDS as analysis-driven NIDS. A HIDS performs file 
integrity checking against files on a host to ensure that they have not been maliciously 
changed. In addition, HIDS looks for unauthorized software that is not part of the baseline 
and checks for the existence of rootkits and possible changes in group and local policies. 
Should any unauthorized event be detected, a HIDS takes real-time action to prevent it and 
generates alerts. OSSEC is provided as part of Security Onion to perform these functions. 
C. NETWORK ANALYSIS TOOLS 
Alerts generated by Snort, Suricata, Bro IDS in conjunction with OSSEC alerts, 
and packets captured by the Netsniff-ng provide security analysts with a pool of data from 
which attacks can be successfully identified. A well-performed analysis can tell a detailed 
story of how the attack was conducted, when the payload was delivered, what the payload 
is and what was affected, where the attack originated, and possibly who perpetrated the 
attack. Such a vast pool of data can be daunting for the human eye to perform analysis on. 
Fortunately, Security Onion is equipped with analysis tools such as Sguil, Squert, and 
Kibana to help present these data as meaningful information from which analysts can make 
the right conclusions. 
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IV. VIRTUAL TESTBED NETWORK 
A. BUILDING A SIEM TESTBED NETWORK 
To evaluate a SIEM, it is best to build a lab environment that can emulate a common 
type of network the SIEM may be installed in. The goal of our lab environment was to use 
both a virtualization hypervisor and a few additional physical machines to host several 
systems for testing. We also wanted to use a firewall to isolate our lab environment from 
the rest of the NPS network. To ensure our lab met the needs of our project, we focused on 
three design characteristics—hardware, network backbone, and software. A thorough 
evaluation of each of these characteristics enabled us to build a lab environment that 
supported the demands of our project. 
1. Hardware 
The hardware we chose for our lab provided more power and resources than we 
conceivably would need. Our entire lab was contained inside a Hewlett Packard Enterprise 
C3000 BladeSystem chassis populated with four BL460C Gen 8 blade servers. Each blade 
server was equipped with two Intel Xeon E5-2670 6-core CPUs, 64 gigabytes of RAM, 
and various hard drive configurations ranging from dual 300 GB Serial Attached SCSI 
(SAS) hard drives to dual 900 GB SAS hard drives. All hard drives were configured as 
Redundant Array of Inexpensive Drives (RAID) level 1 to provide mirroring in case of a 
failed drive. Each blade server was also equipped with six ethernet interfaces supporting 
speeds up to 1 Gbps (gigabits per second) and one Intelligent Platform Management 
Interface (IPMI) interface for Out-Of-Band (OOB) server management. 
2. Network Backbone 
For a network backbone, we utilized two Cisco Catalyst 3120X blade switches that 
were connected to the C3000 blade chassis as Interconnect modules. The Cisco Catalyst 
3120X blade switch is a layer 3 switch and thus performs (limited) routing functionality. 
The two switches were connected via stacking cables in order to operate as one logical 
switch. The switches were running Cisco IOS 12.2(58)SE1, which offered every feature 
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we determined we would likely have needed virtual local area networking (VLAN), port 
mirroring, link aggregation, and secure shell (SSH). Each blade server had two ethernet 
interfaces statically mapped directly to the switches. The blade chassis also was equipped 
with two gigabit ethernet passthrough Interconnect modules which provided physical 
ethernet interfaces that were statically mapped to the four remaining ethernet interfaces on 
each blade server. The network backbone was divided into two separate VLANs—a 
management VLAN and a lab VLAN. Connected to the management VLAN were all the 
IPMI ports from the servers, the management interface for the C3000 blade chassis itself, 
the switch, the firewall and the hypervisor. Connected to the lab VLAN were the firewall, 
the hypervisor, and two blade servers for anything additional we chose not to virtualize. 
3. Software 
The software considerations consisted of choosing a firewall solution, a 
virtualization hypervisor, and a few virtual machines running a variety of operating 
systems. Rather than use an expensive firewall solution from Cisco or Palo Alto, we opted 
for the free PfSense firewall. PfSense is a firewall based on FreeBSD that is distributed as 
an installable ISO image. We installed PfSense onto one of the blade servers and utilized 
three of the network interfaces. One network interface was configured as the wide area 
network (WAN) interface and was connected directly to the NPS intranet. The only traffic 
we permitted inbound on the WAN interface was established traffic and SSH for remote 
management. The other two interfaces were connected directly to the switch—one assigned 
to the management VLAN and the other assigned to the lab VLAN. To provide better 
isolation of our lab network, we ensured that the management VLAN and the lab VLAN 
could not route to each other and were also firewalled from each other. The PfSense 
firewall was configured to provide DHCP services and DNS forwarding to the NPS Intranet 
DNS servers for both the management VLAN and the lab VLAN. 
We opted to leverage the VMWare ESXi hypervisor to allow virtualization of 
Security Onion and additional network hosts. ESXi is a type 1 hypervisor, which means it 
is installed onto the “bare metal” of a machine as opposed to a type 2 hypervisor that is 
installed on top of a host operating system such as VMWare Workstation running on a 
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Windows OS. The main advantage in using a type 1 hypervisor such as ESXi is speed. A 
type 1 hypervisor can run with almost no overhead as opposed to a type 2 hypervisor. ESXi 
provided not only desirable scalability of our network, but also additional functionality, 
such as saving the virtual machine’s state as a snapshot for later restoration. The snapshot 
functionality affords the opportunity to quickly undo a change to a system by reverting to 
a saved state. This is a convenient feature to have, especially for testing. Within the ESXi 
server, we created virtual switches and port groups for both the lab and the management 
VLAN. This enabled us to manage the ESXi server from the management VLAN and also 
create virtual machines that were connected to one or both VLANs. We also created a 
second port group on the lab virtual switch configured to promiscuous mode so that our 
Security Onion virtual machine could monitor all traffic on the lab VLAN. 
We created several virtual machines to encompass what operating systems may be 
found on a modern network. We created a Windows Server 2012 R2 virtual machine and 
promoted it to a domain controller for our “lab.net” domain. We also created a Windows 7 
Pro virtual machine and joined it to the “lab.net” domain. Windows Update was disabled 
on both Windows boxes. This was to ensure the Windows machines had a few 
vulnerabilities in case we needed to throw exploits for malicious traffic generation. We 
created Linux virtual machine running Ubuntu Linux 18.04 to act as a generic Linux box 
on a network. We also created a virtual machine running Kali Linux 2018.2 to provide us 
with an attack platform for simulating an attacker in the network. Finally, we created a 
virtual machine designed to be vulnerable to several exploits. For this we utilized “Basic 
Pentesting: 1” that we downloaded from vulnhub.org—a website dedicated to hosting 
downloadable operating systems with built-in vulnerabilities. 
B. NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
The network diagram in Figure 1 details the architecture of our network and the IP 
addressing scheme utilized. 
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Figure 1. Testbed Network Diagram 
Table 7 lists the configuration of the network services in the lab VLAN. 
Table 7. PfSense Services Provided 
DHCP Server offering the IP addresses for the Management VLAN: 
 10.10.10.200-239 
DHCP Server offering the IP addresses for the Lab VLAN: 
 192.168.1.101-139 
DNS Forwarding for the Lab and Management VLANs 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) 
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V. ELK AND SECURITY ONION INSTALLATION AND 
CONFIGURATION 
Once we built the testbed network, it was time to install and configure ELK via 
Security Onion. There were several steps we needed to take to get ELK up and running. 
First, we needed to ensure we had the necessary resources required for installation. Next, 
we performed the installation, configured Security Onion and deployed ELK. Last, we 
verified ELK was running correctly and familiarized ourselves with the configuration of 
ELK. 
A. GATHERING RESOURCES 
Before we could begin installing ELK we needed to gather the resources we needed 
to begin the process. We needed to create a virtual machine (VM) on our VMWare ESXi 
equipped with the system resources required to execute ELK and the Security Onion 
distribution. We also needed to ensure we had the installation media required to install 
ELK. 
1. Building the Virtual Machine 
We initially built our VM based off the minimum system requirements stated for 
Security Onion and used 1 CPU core, 8 GB of RAM, and 200 GB of hard disk space. 
However, we found that to achieve long term stability and robust performance, we needed 
to increase to 4 CPU cores and 16 GB of RAM. We attached three network interfaces to 
the VM—One connected to our management VLAN, one connected to the lab VLAN tap 
(for traffic monitoring), and one connected to the lab VLAN to receive logs from our 
OSSEC agents. We also selected Ubuntu Linux 64-bit as the Guest OS version as that is 
what Security Onion is based on. 
2. Downloading Security Onion 
Before we could begin our installation, we needed a copy of Security Onion. The 
Security Onion distribution is provided as a downloadable International Standards 
Organization (ISO) 9660 image. We downloaded the ISO image directly from the Security 
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Onion github.com page to our workstation. As a security precaution, we verified the 
integrity of the ISO image using the Linux “gpg” command with the signatures and steps 
provided on the Security Onion download page. After verifying the integrity of the ISO 
image, we uploaded it to the ESXi datastore and assigned it to the DVD drive of the newly 
created Security Onion VM. 
B. SECURITY ONION INSTALLATION 
Once we had a VM built and the Security Onion ISO downloaded and assigned to 
the VM, we booted up the VM and began the installation process. After booting from the 
ISO image, Security Onion ran as a live demo and did not write anything to disk. To begin 
the installation, we ran the “Install Security Onion 16.04” script on the desktop. The install 
process was standard to most Ubuntu Linux installations—choosing a language, enabling 
auto-updating during installation, hard disk selection and partitioning, selecting a time 
zone, and a keyboard layout. On the last screen of the installation process, we chose a 
username, hostname, and password. We configured the username to be “sysop” (short for 
system operator) and the hostname to be “seconion.” After several minutes, the installation 
finished and a prompt to restart appeared. Upon restarting the VM, Security Onion booted 
up and presented a prompt for login credentials. Because Security Onion was running in a 
VM, we wanted to install the VMWare tools to enable optimizations such as automatic 
screen resolution changes and copy and paste capabilities. To install the VMWare tools, 
we logged in using the sysop credentials, opened a terminal and executed the following 
commands in Table 8. 
Table 8. VMWare Tools Installation 
Command Description 
sudo apt update Updated the Ubuntu software lists from the 
installed software repositories. 
Sudo apt install open-vm-tools-desktop Installed the VMWare tools. 
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C. SECURITY ONION CONFIGURATION AND ELK INSTALLATION 
To perform the Security Onion configuration, ELK installation and initial 
configuration, there were several steps that needed to be taken. We first needed to update 
the system, then we needed to execute the setup script on the Security Onion desktop twice. 
The first execution assigned initial network configurations and initiated a reboot. The 
second execution installed, and configured ELK and additional components included in 
Security Onion. Then there were several commands that need to be executed to provide 
additional configurations necessary to complete the setup. 
1. Security Onion Update 
Before we began any installation or configuration, we wanted to be sure our system 
was up to date. This ensured that all proceeding installation and configuration scripts were 
the latest. The first step in the update process is to execute the “soup” command from the 
terminal. Soup is short for Security Onion update, and this command will automatically 
initiate installation of all available updates for the Ubuntu operating system, the Security 
Onion distribution, and the IDS rules. The script completed after approximately 10 minutes 
and we were prompted to press enter to reboot. 
2. Setup Script Round 1: Initial Network Configuration 
There are several steps that need to be taken to configure Security Onion and install 
and configure ELK. To begin, we logged into the Security Onion desktop and executed the 
Elastic setup script on the desktop by double-clicking the icon titled “Setup.” Once 











Before the previous services were installed, the script prompted for the initial 
configuration of the management and monitoring interfaces. First, we selected which 
interface was to be used for our management VLAN, and then assigned it a static IP address 
of 10.10.10.50/24, a default gateway of 10.10.10.1, and a DNS server of 10.10.10.1. 
Second, we selected which interface was to be used as our monitoring interface. This was 
the interface associated with the VLAN tap that we added during the VM creation. After 
selecting the management and monitoring interfaces, the script committed the changes and 
prompted us to reboot. 
3. Setup Script Round 2: ELK Installation and Configuration 
After the reboot, we logged back in and executed the setup script a second time. 
This time, the script recognized the completion of the initial network configuration and 
allowed us to proceed to the next phase. Our next prompt allowed us to choose between 
Evaluation Mode and Production Mode. Evaluation Mode automates many of the 
installation options and is—as the script describes—”recommended for first-time users” 
and “NOT intended for a production deployment.” We chose Production Mode so that we 
could more explicitly control the installation process. Next, we were prompted to choose 
between adding our Security Onion machine to a new or existing deployment. We were 
not adding our Security Onion machine as a member of an existing deployment, so we 
chose “New.” The next prompt in the script asks for the creation of a user account. This 
user is used for logging into Kibana (and other monitoring tools), and so we created an 
account named “siemop”—short for SIEM operator. 
The next step in the script prompted for the selection of “Best Practices” or 
“Custom” options for the remainder of the configuration process. We chose custom so that 
we could see what options were being set, but ultimately decided that the defaults were 
suitable choices for the configuration. Next in the script we were prompted for the 
configuration of Sguil. Table 9 lists the default configuration options provided and chosen. 
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Days of alerts to keep in Sguil database 30 /etc/nsm/securityonion.conf 
Days of data to repair in Sguil database (a 




Once the Sguil configuration options were specified, we were then prompted to 
configure IDS options. First, we needed to choose which IDS rule-set to use. We chose the 
only ruleset that did not require a paid subscription—”Emerging Threats Open.” Next, 
when prompted to choose between Suricata and Snort, we chose to use Suricata. According 
to [27], both are good IDSs but our personal preference is Suricata, as it offers 
multithreading capabilities not available in Snort. 
After selecting Suricata, we chose to “Enable network sensor services” which 
includes Suricata for intrusion detection, Bro for protocol logging, and netsniff-ng for 
packet capture. The next several steps in the script allowed for granular configuration of 
each of the network sensor services. The network services configuration began by asking 
to set the PF_RING min_sum_slots configuration setting. According to the Security Onion 
discussion forum, this number is essentially the queue size for Bro to use during packet 
capture [28]. The setup process analyzes the system and determines an appropriate number 
[29]. We elected to use the recommended number of 4096 for our installation. Next, we 
were prompted to confirm our previously selected monitoring interface, enable the IDS 
engine, and then select which network ranges we wanted to monitor. Our intent was to 
monitor our lab VLAN so we entered “192.168.1.0/24” as the range to be monitored. At 
our next prompt, we confirmed enabling Bro, selected yes to enable file extraction (this 
saves all files sniffed from the network to /nsm/bro/extracted), and finally chose to enable 
full packet capture. The script then asked what maximum memory allocation to use for 
saved packet capture (PCAP) files. Larger individual PCAP files take longer to process so 
we opted for the default size of 150 MB. We proceeded with the setup by selecting the 
default I/O method for netsniff-ng and the default size of 64 MB for the PCAP ring buffer. 
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The PCAP ring buffer is the amount of RAM allocated to the monitoring interface—too 
little allocated RAM could result in dropped packets. Next, when prompted to choose the 
percentage of disk usage to trigger purging of old logs, we chose the default of 90%. 
The next prompt in the script asked whether we wanted to enable Salt for 
management of our Security Onion deployment. Salt will automatically keep IDS rule-sets 
updated, so naturally we opted to accept the default and enable Salt. Moving forward, we 
were prompted to enable the Elastic Stack and thus ensure the core components of our 
SIEM solution were running. The last stage of the setup script deals with storage 
configuration. Next, we were asked whether we would be storing logs locally or using a 
remote logging server. Although using a remote logging server might be a better choice for 
deployment on a larger network, local storage was more suitable for our needs. When asked 
for the amount of allocated space for disk storage, we accepted the default size of 94 GB. 
Last, we were presented with a confirmation prompt stating that the following changes 
were about to be performed. 
• Set the OS time zone to UTC. 
• Delete any existing NSM data/configuration. 
• Create a Sguil server named seucrityonion. 
• Create a user account named siemop. 
• Monitor each of the following interfaces: ens 192 
• Run a single IDS engine process per interface. 
• Run a single Bro process per interface. 
• Download Emerging Threats Open ruleset. 
• Configure IDS HOME_NET as 192.168.1.0/24. 
• Configure Elastic Stack. 
Upon clicking “proceed,” the last steps of the installation began and after 
approximately 10 minutes, the script reported it was finished. We were then provided a 
series of informational dialog boxes reporting: successful completion of various 
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components, where various logs can be found, and the following commands in Table 10 
for checking on the status of the Security Onion services. 
Table 10. Security Onion Status Commands 
Command Description 
sudo sostat Detailed information about service status 
sudo sostat-quick Guided tour of sostat output 
sudo-sostat-redacted Redacted information to share with the mailing list in 
case of questions 
 
4. Additional Configurations 
After both setup scripts were executed, we still needed to perform additional 
configurations to add an interface for receiving HIDS logs, and to adjust the firewall rules 
to allow all necessary inbound connections. Leading up to this point, we only had two 
interfaces configured—a management interface with the IP address of 10.10.10.50 for 
remote interaction, and a monitoring interface in promiscuous mode for network sniffing. 
The interface for collecting OSSEC logs was connected to the lab VLAN but needed an IP 
address assigned so that the OSSEC agents could be configured with a log shipment 
destination. To configure the additional interface, we needed to edit the “/etc/network/
interfaces” configuration file to add a configuration entry for the log collection interface 
and then reboot for the changes to take effect. Figure 2 illustrates the additional 
configuration entries we appended to the file: 
 
Figure 2. etc/network/interfaces configuration 
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After rebooting, we proceeded to adjust the firewall rules to allow various required 
inbound connections. Security Onion offers a script named “so-allow” for updating the 
firewall, but we found it lacks in granularity, so we used the “ufw” command for adjusting 
the firewall rules. The “ufw” command—short for “uncomplicated firewall” enabled us to 
more precisely and securely configure the firewall with only the following two commands 
listed in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. ufw firewall configuration 
The first “ufw” command listed in Figure 3 allowed TCP ports 22 (SSH), 443 
(HTTPS), and 7734 (Sguil) in on the management interface to the management IP address 
10.10.10.50. The second command allowed UDP port 1514 (OSSEC agent) in on the lab 
interface to the lab IP address. After the firewall was updated, we now had full access to 
ELK from our management VLAN. Additionally, the necessary TCP port (1514) for 
OSSEC agent log collection was open for later OSSEC and OSSEC Agent installation and 
configuration. 
D. ELK CONFIGURATION 
Within Security Onion, ELK components come preconfigured to work in tandem. 
This pre-configuration was perfect for a stand-alone network environment such as the one 
used for the purpose of this capstone. This configuration may not work well for all network 
architectures. In a heavily distributed network architecture; for example, there may be a 
need to store indexes at multiple geographic areas. Knowing the location of ELK 
configuration files within Security Onion, and understanding their purpose, is crucial when 
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it comes to customizing ELK’s components configurations to satisfy your specific network 
needs. 
1. Elasticsearch 
To speed the process of searching for logs and finding attributes based on filters, 
Elasticsearch creates and saves Lucene indexes of logs available in Logstash. Lucene, as 
defined in [30] is a high performance and scalable search engine application programming 
interface written in Java. Lucene was written by Doug Cutting and is owned by Apache 
Software Foundation. Lucene query syntax uses indexes to search for text. The Security 
Onion default configuration of ELK allocates one primary shard for each index, and zero 
replica for all primary shards. In a distributed architecture, Elasticsearch indexes are 
distributed across numerous nodes; each element of an index that resides on a node is called 
as a shard. This is different from the default configuration of ELK, which according to 
Elastic [31], allocates five primary shards to each index, and one replica for each primary 
shard (a total of 10 shards per index), as to allow for redundancy. These replicas can be 
stored on separate nodes on the network—a cloudlike approach to eliminate a single point 
of failure. To check for existing shards, we typed the command “curl localhost: 9200/_cat/
shards | grep logstash | sort.” 
The output from this command is shown in Figure 4. There is a daily shard for 
logstash-bro, logstash-ids, and logstash-syslog. Given that the system was configured two 
days beforehand, there were only two shards available per index. 
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Figure 4. List of Shards 
Though we opted to the keep the shards configuration as is, the number of generated 
shards and their replicas is modifiable by accessing the “template.json” configuration files 
in the “/etc/logstash” directory. This is doable by navigating to the directory and opening 
the “logstash-template.json” configuration files using vim editor or an editor of choice. A 
search for the string “number_of_shards” and/or “number_of_replicas” would have led to 
the line where the number of shards or replicas can be changed as necessary. A listing of 
the “/etc/logstash” directory for all “template.json” files is in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. List of template.json Files 
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In addition to the json configuration files, are three “yml” configuration files 
located in the “/etc/elasticsearch” directory. 
• The “elasticsearch.yml” configuration file allows for the setting of master 
node(s) on the network. In our case, the master node setting was left at its 
default value of “1” and the network host IP of “0.0.0.0” to reflect the 
localhost. Should more nodes be involved in receiving shard replicas, this 
is where it would be configured. Also, the location where Elasticsearch 
logs are to be sent and stored is configured here. Elasticsearch path is set 
by default to send and save its logs to “/var/log/elasticsearch.” 
• The “jvm.options” configuration file is where the Java Virtual Machine 
(JVM) settings for Elasticsearch is configured. Among the many important 
JVM settings in this file, it is important to note that this is where the JVM 
minimum and maximum heap sizes are set. A larger heap size can 
improve speed but will also consume more memory. If there is a need to 
change the heap sizes, both the minimum and maximum heap sizes must 
be set to the same value. The heap sizes were set automatically during 
installation to 4106 megabytes as reflected by the following entries in the 
“jvm.options” configuration file: 
 Xms4106m 
 Xmx4106m 
• The “log4j2.properties” configuration file is where policies for logs that 
we wish to generate for Elasticsearch is defined. This file specifies the 
type, layout, patterns, policies, and strategies. Easily distinguishable is the 
fact that Elasticsearch logs are rolling. 
2. Logstash 
In the “/etc/logstash” directory, are five configuration files that affect how Logstash 
processes and ingests log data. Those files are “beat-template.json,” “jvm.options,” 
“log4j2.properties,” “logstash-template.json,” and “logstash.yml.” While we mentioned 
the same “template.json” configuration files in the Elasticsearch configuration section 
above for the purpose of indicating how many shards to create, most of the contained 
configurations affect the parsing and mapping of log data to either “logstash-*” or 
“logstash-beats-*” indexes—which are created by default in Kibana and can be viewed 
under the management tab.  
• The “beats-template.json” file is the template that holds configuration data 
for mapping log data to the “logstash-beats-*” index. 
38 
• The “logstash-template.json” file is the template that holds configuration 
data for mapping log data to the “logstash-*” index. 
• The “jvm.options” file holds configuration data for Logstash use of JVM 
to include heap space allocation. Similar to Elasticsearch, Logstash is 
allocated two Gigabytes of heap space. 
• The “Logstash.yml” file holds Logstash configuration to identify the input 
node, data path, pipeline settings during the filter and output stages, 
module settings for plugins, cloud settings, queuing settings, dead-letter 
queue settings, metrics settings, debugging settings, and other settings.  
• The “log4j2.properties” file contains configuration data for how, where, 
and when to store and delete Logstash logs. The current configuration is 
set to roll (delete) logs after seven days. This is indicated in the file with 
the following line: 
“appender.rolling.strategy.action.condition.nested_condition.age = 7D” 
 
Note: Log formats with fields for which configuration data is not included in these 
two templates are sent to Elasticsearch without being indexed. A custom template may be 
created if desired to have such logs indexed [32]. Information on how to do this is available 
at https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/security-onion/wiki/Logstash. Figure 6 
shows a list of the “/etc/logstash” directory contents. 
 
Figure 6. /etc/logstash directory 
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3. Kibana 
For the purpose of quickly detecting cyber-attacks conducted against the network 
environment that we created for the purpose of this study, we added a custom dashboard 
to Kibana and configured it with some Lucene queries that are discussed in this section. 
However, for the most part, Kibana came well configured with a long list of visualizations; 
such as data tables, vertical and horizontal bar graphs, tag clouds, line plots, and pie charts 
that reflect trends and metrics for logs, alerts, events, and detected incidents on the 
monitored network. Before addressing visualizations within Kibana, it is important to note 
where its configuration files are located: “/etc/kibana” and “/etc/nsm.”  
• In “/etc/kibana,” the “kibana.yml” configuration file holds information 
that denote the kibana server name (“Kibana” in this case), the server host 
(“0” indicating the localhost), Elasticsearch’s Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL) (http://elasticsearch:9200), and where Kibana is to send and store 
generated logs. Kibana logs can be found in “/var/log/kibana/kibana.log.” 
• In “/etc/nsm” is the “securityonion.conf” file with configuration data that 
indicate settings that were applied during the installation of Security 
Onion, ELK, and other included network monitoring tools. On line 81 of 
this file, the following Kibana options can be found and modified: 
Kibana_enabled (where the option to enable or disable Kibana is 
available), the kibana index name (a different index can be specified here 
if need be), the version number, the tap ID, and additional options which is 
left blank by default. 
a. How to Access Kibana 
Kibana is accessible via a web interface. Following ELK installation, the Kibana 
launch icon was added to the list of applications and to the desktop. Double clicking on the 
icon launches the web browser and links the Kibana logging page at “https://localhost/app/
kibana.” To access Kibana remotely, we simply replaced “localhost” with the Security 
Onion host IP “https://10.10.10.50/app/kibana.” As stated in Section C.3 of this chapter, 
we had to configure the “ufw” to allow remote access to hosts on the management VLAN. 
Figure 7 shows an image of the Kibana login page.  
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Figure 7. Kibana Login Page  
b. Tour of the Kibana Interface 
As depicted on the Kibana login page in Figure 7, we entered the login credentials 
for “siemop” created during ELK’s installation and clicked “Login.” The Overview 
dashboard appeared with various visualization panels showing available log numbers, the 
number of installed sensors, a count of detected devices, a list of all log types and the 
number of logs available for specific log types, the number of NIDS and OSSEC alerts, pie 
charts of sensors and services, Bro connections, OSSEC alerts, and NIDS alerts, and a 
formatted table at the very bottom of the dashboard listing all available logs. The Overview 
dashboard is the default page that Kibana displays at login. Figure 8 shows the Overview 
dashboard which is also accessible by clicking on the Home button in the Navigation panel. 
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Figure 8. Kibana Overview Dashboard 
The overview dashboard in Figure 8 is set to display events that occurred within 
the last 15 minutes. This information is visible at the top right corner of the dashboard 
window. The time range can be easily changed by clicking on it. The time range may be 
changed to the following settings:  
• Quick—ranging from Last 5 years to last 15 minutes. 
• Relative—from “Years” to “Now.” 
• Absolute—from a very specific time to another. 
Figure 9 is a depiction of all available time range options. 
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Figure 9. Time range tab 
Figure 10 indicates a dashboard interface that allows the user to set the dashboard 
refresh time interval, or turn it off altogether. Refresh settings range from five seconds to 
one day. 
 
Figure 10. Auto-refresh tab 
The Edit tab allows the user to enter the dashboard display settings mode. In the 
settings mode, visualizations may be edited to show more or less aggregation, or to change 
from one visualization type to another. The panel title may be edited or expanded to full 
screen; or the panel may be entirely removed from the dashboard. Figure 11 shows options 
available in the Edit tab. 
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Figure 11. Settings under the “Edit” Tab 
The Clone tab allows for a copy or the dashboard in view to be created and saved. 
There were 54 dashboards available by default in the Kibana version 6.2.4 of the Security 
Onion package. 
The share tab allows for sharing of saved dashboard or snapshots. As represented 
in Figure 12, saved dashboards and snapshots may be shared by copying and sending 
embedded iframes or links. Short URLs are also available for Snapshots. 
 
Figure 12. Sharing Dashboards and Snapshots 
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Below the tabs mentioned above is the search bar where Lucene queries can be used 
to find items of interest in Elasticsearch indexes. Below the search bar is the “Add a filter” 
option which allows additional reduction of the displayed results. To the left of the 
dashboard is the navigation panel with a listing of available dashboards for Alert Data, Bro 
Hunting, Host Hunting, and Other. Clicking on “Help” located below the “Home” button, 
provides a description of the type of information that is available on each dashboard as well 
as the sidebar options. 
In addition to the Dashboard, the following icons can be seen on the sidebar (located 
to the left of the Kibana window in blue color): Kibana (slightly to the right of the Kibana 
logo), Discover, Visualize, Timelion, Dev Tools, Management, and Squert. A description 
of each follows. 
The Kibana icon links to the Kibana home page where detailed setup guidance can 
be found. Figure 13 is a depiction of the home page where a list of all installed plugins may 
also be found. 
 
Figure 13. Kibana Home Page 
45 
The Discover page allows analysts to explore logs and alert data by selecting the 
desired index pattern. Available default index patterns are “*: elastalert_status*,” 
“*:logstash-*,” and “*:logstash-beats-*.” Similar to the dashboard, data available in these 
indexes can be filtered by using the “Add a filter” options, and/or queried using the Lucene 
search bar. When a time range is set, the resulting information is displayed and represented 
by a histogram that reflects the corresponding level of occurrences. Below the histogram 
is an expandable list of logged events. When expanded, event information may be viewed 
in table format, in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), or a single document. Should 
specific fields be of interest, a list of all available fields can be referenced for consideration. 
Figure 14 shows information that became available within 15 minutes of the image being 
captured. The specific date/time range is auto-generated and displayed right above the 
histogram. A total of 860 hits resulted from this search and the index being queried is 
“*:logstash-*.” 
 
Figure 14. Discovery Page  
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Under Visualize is the list of all available visualization charts and metric designs. 
389 visualizations are available by default; many of which are linked to dashboard pages. 
These visualizations can be customized to any particular network environment. Custom 
visualizations can also be created and added to dashboards. To do this, we clicked on the 
plus symbol found on the Visualize Page (Figure 15) to access a list of available 
visualization options. The following visualization options are available: 
• Basic charts: area, heat map, horizontal bar, line, pie, and vertical bar. 
• Data: data table, gauge, goal, and metric. 
• Maps: coordinate map, and region map. 
• Other: controls, markdown, tag cloud, vega. 
 
Figure 15. Visualize Page 
Timelion is a visualization plugin that is also viewable and manageable under 
Visualize. The icon on the sidebar is a quick link to access its options, add new ones, and 
delete or modify existing charts. In timelion, data from various sources can be combined 
to generate a visual representation of changes over time. Figure 16 illustrates the creation 
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of a simple chart to show the count of queries performed on Elasticsearch over time. To 
configure Timelion charts, we began by typing a period (.) inside the configuration panel 
and a list of available options appeared. Further information on how to add and configure 
Timelion can be found on https://github.com/elastic/timelion. 
 
Figure 16. Timelion Page 
The Dev Tools plugin is a command line interface that interacts directly with 
Elasticsearch. Figure 16 depicts the plugin which is equipped with a console that is divided 
into two panes: request and response. The request pane, to the left of the console, is where 
commands to query Elasticsearch are entered. The response pane, to the right of the console 
(empty in Figure 17), is where results from entered queries are displayed. 
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Figure 17. Dev Tools Page 
Under Management, the current version of Kibana may be found. The version 
installed for the purpose of this study is Kibana version 6.2.4. As depicted in Figure 18, the 
submenus are Index Patterns, Saved Objects, and Advanced Settings. 
• Index Patterns provides a graphical user interface that allows for the 
modification of existing indexes. To modify the configuration of an index, 
select the desired index to the left of the page and click on the edit button 
to modify its patterns. To created new indexes, click on “create index 
pattern.” 
• Under Saved Objects, the user may import, export, or delete: dashboards, 
saved searches, and visualizations. When exporting, files are exported in 
JSON format.  
• Advanced Settings provides an avenue for Advanced users to edit settings 
that can impact several objects within Kibana. A caution banner on this 
page states that “You can break stuff here.”  
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Figure 18. Management Page 
The Squert plugin is a link to Squert—a web application used to query IDS alerts. 
Squert is one of the many visualization tools included in Security Onion. More information 
about Squert can be found on GitHub at https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/
security-onion/wiki/Squert. 
c. Alert Monitoring Using Kibana 
ELK provides us with numerous logs that contain event data and alerts from various 
systems within the network. Using Kibana, we could view logs and alert data, and network 
trends and metrics. However, this information would be less useful to a network security 
analyst if it was hard to sift through. The ability to promptly detect an intrusion was our 
goal, and having the most pertinent information brought “forward” to the analyst is an 
essential element of this goal. To have such a visualization available to us, we created a 
custom dashboard to see NIDS (Suricata) and HIDS (OSSEC) alerts. To further configure 
the custom dashboard, we added the following visualizations and saved searches:  
• Visualizations: NIDS—Alerts Over Time, OSSEC Alerts—Log Count 
Over Time, and Navigation. 
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• Saved searches: NIDS—Alerts and OSSEC—Alerts. 
Note that these visualizations and saved searches were already available as part of 
the ELK installation. Once created, we could see an abundance of NIDS and HIDS alerts. 
To make this information more effective for our goal—quick detection of an incident—we 
needed to have Kibana display the most useful information. Two options are available to 
query the available data, either using the “add a filter” option, or creating a Lucene query. 
We elected to use a Lucene query even though the Elasticsearch Query DSL would allow 
us to do the same. Then, we the used the following syntax: 
((event_type:snort) AND (priority:[1 TO 3])) OR (alert_type:emerging 
threat) OR ((event_type:ossec) AND (alert_level:[3 TO 15])) 
To create the above query, we needed to familiarize ourselves with Snort alert 
classifications since Suricata uses Snort and Emerging Threat rules [27]. Snort alert 
priorities are ranked as high, medium or low. These priority levels are represented in 
Kibana as priorities 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Additionally, we needed to understand OSSEC 
rule classifications. These rules range from levels 0 through 15, with level 15 representing 
the most severe indicator. In our Lucene syntax, we elected to monitor NIDS alerts marked 
as priorities 1 or 2, and HIDS alerts from levels 3 to 15. Appendix A provides a list of Snort 
priorities, and Appendix B provides a list of OSSEC rule classifications. To complete the 
dashboard, we set the time range for events to query to 24 hours and set the dashboard to 
refresh every five minutes. We saved the dashboard as “_NIDS&HIDS Alerts.” For quick 
access, we added this custom dashboard to the Navigation panel at the top of the Alert Data 
section (visible in Figure 19). The steps used to do this are as followed:  
• Click on Visualize. 
• In the search bar, type “Navigation.” The Navigation Visualization will 
appear. 
• Click on the Navigation visualization and locate “**Alert Data** portion 
near the top. 
• Type the following: [<dashboard name>](<dashboard link>). 
Note for step 4: The dashboard name is whatever we decided to name it on the 
navigation panel. We named ours [NHIDS Alerts]. The dashboard link was obtained by 
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navigating to the “_NIDS&HIDS Alerts” dashboard and by clicking “share” for a list of 
links and embedded iframes. Then, we clicked on Copy to save the link to the clipboard. 
The only portion we needed was the part of the link starting with /app and ending right 
before the question mark (?). The link was “/app/kibana#/dashboard/f4e77720-8e09-11e8-
9c56-4d6f58ed628a.” The complete insert was the following: 
“[NHIDS Alerts] (/app/kibana#/dashboard/f4e77720-8e09-11e8-9c56-4d6f58ed628a).” 
 
Figure 19. Custom Dashboard 
d. Reporting Using Kibana 
Kibana is more of a front-end visualization tool than it is a reporting tool. However, 
it provides analysts with the ability to export visualizations, logs, NetFlow, and packet 
captures that can be used in the generation and support of a detailed incident report. When 
viewing a NIDS alert in Kibana for example, the options to list the alert data in either a 
table (Figure 20) or JSON (Figure 21) format are displayed. In addition, the alert may be 
viewed as a single document or with surrounding documents. If the “View single 
document” option is selected, a format such as the one shown in Figures 20 and 21 is 
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displayed. Otherwise, if the option to “View surrounding documents” is selected, Kibana 
returns a stream of correlated logs such as the one depicted in Figure 22. The logs are 
presented in chronological order, and all refer to the same alerted activity. Some field items 
such as “_id,” “source_ip,” “source_port,” “destination_ip,” “destination_port,” and 
“signature_info” are clickable hyperlinks that provide detailed and/or aggregated 
information about that specific item (IP or port). 
 
Figure 20. Single Document View (Table Format) 
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Figure 21. Single Document View (JSON Format) 
Clicking on the alert ID links to the CapME Webpage. CapME is one of the many 
web interfaces included as part of the Security Onion toolkit that allows analysts to view 
packets captured in pcap format. The CapME login page appears with the alert id and Max 
Xscript Bytes pre-populated as credentials. The options to view the alert output as auto, 
tcpflow, Bro, or pcap are presented as choices. You may choose to view pcap rendered to 
the index being queried with Bro, tcpflow, download the pcap, or view a combination of 
what is available. The source IP, destination IP, and ports hyperlinks link to an indicator 
dashboard in Kibana that shows an aggregated count table of logs and alerts that account 
for the IP in question.  
All available visualizations may be exported in either a raw or formatted CSV file. 
Last, customized searches may be saved and shared with other analysts. 
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Figure 22. Surrounding Documents View 
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VI. OSSEC INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION 
To meet the definitional requirements of a SIEM, we needed to incorporate OSSEC 
into the ELK setup. Security Onion installs with OSSEC by default and will incorporate 
OSSEC logs into ELK. But before we could begin using OSSEC, we needed to ensure our 
SIEM was configured to receive logs from OSSEC agents, and this; in turn, required that 
we install OSSEC agents on each of the hosts in the lab VLAN from which we wanted to 
collect OSSEC logs. There were no firewall adjustments required as that had already been 
completed as described in Chapter V, Section C.3. 
A. AGENT MANAGEMENT ON SECURITY ONION 
OSSEC provides an interactive script for agent management. To execute the script, 
we ran the following command from the SIEM server: “sudo /var/ossec/bin/
manage_agents.” The manage_agents script allows for adding and removing an agent, 
extracting the encryption key for an agent, and listing already added  agents. Using the 
script, we added server-side agent configurations for each host in the lab VLAN. The script 
does not install the agent on a host but merely creates a server-hosted object (an API for 
server-host OSSEC information exchange) and encryption key to be used later, when 
actually installing agent software on a host. Figure 23 illustrates steps taken to add an agent 
entry for the Ubuntu Linux host. 
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Figure 23. OSSEC Server-side Agent Entry 
57 
As illustrated in Figure 23, we first entered “A” to add an agent, and were then 
prompted to enter a name for the new agent. Next, we were prompted to add the IP address, 
but because our lab VLAN is running DHCP with non-statically assigned IPs, we added 
the IP range of the lab VLAN. We accepted the default agent unique ID number and then 
confirmed the addition. Last, we extracted the encryption key specific to the newly added 
agent. The encryption key was used later during the OSSEC agent installation process. The 
process above was repeated for each of the hosts in the lab VLAN. As illustrated in Figure 
24, once all hosts in the lab VLAN were added, we restarted the OSSEC server service to 
ensure it was listening for agent connections on UDP port 1514. 
 
Figure 24. OSSEC Server-service restart 
B. AGENT INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION ON LINUX 
Once the agent management was completed on the SIEM, we then needed to add 
OSSEC agents on each of the hosts in the lab VLAN. The process for adding the OSSEC 
agent on the Linux hosts consisted of adding the OSSEC software repository, installing 
OSSEC agent software, and then configuring the OSSEC agent. We began with our Ubuntu 
Linux VM. The screenshot provided in Figure 25 illustrates the steps we took for adding 
the OSSEC software repository. 
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Figure 25. Adding the OSSEC software repository 
As illustrated in Figure 25, we added the atomicorp.com (OSSEC software 
developer) key to our Linux host. This allows software from Atomicorp to be trusted, 
which then enabled us to install software from their repository. Then we added the 
Atomicorp software repository to our Linux host and then updated the list of installable 
software from newly added repository. 
The next step was to install the OSSEC agent software. Installing this agent was as 
simple as executing the following command: “sudo apt install ossec-hids-agent.” During 
the OSSEC agent installation process, we were prompted for the OSSEC server IP address. 
This is the 192.168.1.254 address configured on our SIEM. 
The last step was configuring the OSSEC agent. Figure 26 provides a screenshot 
illustrating the OSSEC agent configuration process. 
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Figure 26. OSSEC Agent for Linux - Configuration 
As illustrated in Figure 26, we executed the manage_agents script, and when 
prompted to import the key from the OSSEC server, we pasted the encryption key 
generated on the SIEM during the add agent procedure addressed earlier (Chapter VI, 
Section A). For changes to take effect immediately, we executed the following command 
to restart the OSSEC agent service. “sudo /var/ossec/bin/ossec-control restart.” We 
repeated this same procedure on the Basic Pentesting 1 VM, which completed the OSSEC 
agent installation and configuration for all Linux VMs in our lab VLAN, aside from our 
KALI Linux VM. We did not install an OSSEC agent on our KALI VM as that is the 
machine we will be initiating attacks from. 
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C. AGENT INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION ON WINDOWS 
We wanted our SIEM to not only collect logs from our Linux VMs, but also our 
Windows VMs; so we proceeded to install an OSSEC agent on every Windows VM. The 
process for installing OSSEC agents on Windows machines was the same regardless of 
Windows version. First, we downloaded the OSSEC agent, then we installed the agent, 
added the key, and restarted the service. 
We began by installing an OSSEC agent on our Windows 7 Pro VM. To 
download the OSSEC agent, we navigated to the following page with our web browser: 
“https://www.atomicorp.com/ossec-downloads/.” The page includes a link for the latest 
OSSEC agent for Windows. Once downloaded, we ran the executable to begin the 
installation process. The process begins by requiring you to accept the End User License 
Agreement. Once you agree, the next step asks which OSSEC agent components to 
install. Figure 27 provides a screenshot that illustrates the component selection step of 
this installation process. 
 
Figure 27. OSSEC Agent Installation for Windows—Component Selection 
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We proceeded with the defaults as that is what was recommended, and there is no 
harm in scanning and monitoring for Internet Information Services (IIS) logs even if not 
every Windows VM is running IIS. Next, we selected the default installation directory and 
the installation process completed. We left the checkbox selected for “Run OSSEC Agent 
Manager” and clicked finish. The screenshot provided in Figure 28 illustrates the OSSEC 
Agent Manager. 
 
Figure 28. OSSEC Agent Manager for Windows—Unconfigured 
For OSSEC Server IP we entered the 192.168.1.254 interface address from our 
SIEM, and for Authentication key we entered the encryption key we generated on the SIEM 
during the add agent procedure described earlier (Chapter VI, Section A). After entering 
the IP and key information, we clicked save, and a dialog box appeared asking to confirm 
importing of the key. We clicked OK to confirm, then clicked the Manage button on the 
top left of the OSSEC Agent Manager, then clicked restart to start the newly configured 
OSSEC Agent. Figure 29 is a screenshot illustrating the fully configured OSSEC agent on 
our Windows 7 VM. 
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Figure 29. OSSEC Agent Manager for Windows—Fully Configured 
We repeated this process on every other Windows VM on our lab VLAN until every 
remaining Windows VM was running an OSSEC Agent. 
D. VERIFICATION OF OSSEC AGENT COMMUNICATION FROM 
CLIENT TO SIEM 
Verification of the OSSEC agent connection to OSSEC server on our SIEM was a 
very straightforward task. This can be done after all agents are configured, or each time a 
new agent is configured. OSSEC agent connectivity can be verified using the command 




Figure 30. OSSEC Agent Verification 
As can be seen in Figure 30, the agent_control utility is listing all connected agents. 
The topmost connected agent is the OSSEC agent running on the SIEM itself. This is a 
default configuration of Security Onion. Each connection below was added manually in 
Sections B and C of this chapter. The word “Active” on the right side of each connection 
denotes that each agent is connected successfully. If there were an issue, it would say 
“Inactive” or “Never connected.” 
Troubleshooting each connection can be performed by examining the OSSEC agent 
log file. On the Windows clients, the logs can be obtained by viewing the following file: 
“c:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\ossec.log,” or from the OSSEC Agent Manager by 
clicking “View” and then “View Logs.” On the Linux clients, the logs can be obtained by 
viewing the following file: “/var/ossec/logs/ossec.log.” The logs are very detailed and 
provided us all the information we needed to troubleshoot any connections we encountered. 
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VII. INCIDENT DETECTION AND CORRELATION WITH ELK 
In this stage of the study, we conducted four malicious cyber actions against several 
hosts on the lab network to test ELK’s ability to detect incidents and generate alerts. In 
conducting these attacks, we simulated malicious cyber activity by using several tools on 
Kali Linux. We utilized the Kibana dashboard to discover the malicious cyber activity and 
perform analysis on each specific attack. During our analysis, we wanted close to real-time 
information, so we set the dashboard to refresh every minute. 
A. MALICIOUS ACTIVITY CORRELATION 
We conducted all the malicious cyber activity internally from within the lab VLAN. 
In a real-world scenario, internal network access is often acquired from an attacker initially 
via activities such as phishing or gaining physical access. However, once the attacker has 
gained an initial internal foothold into a network, access expansion will be attempted to 
gain privileged access to workstations, servers and network devices. Because our malicious 
activities were conducted inside the lab VLAN, our activity would be consistent with the 
access expansion efforts of an attacker (e.g., reconnaissance, lateral-movement, privilege 
escalation, and further exploitations). Our four malicious actions began with a port scan, 
followed by an online password cracking attack, then a Web server attack, and finally, an 
exploitation of a Windows server. 
1. Port Scan 
The first malicious cyber action we chose to conduct was a port scan. Port scans 
are commonly done by an attacker to enumerate network resources. Although network 
administrators may conduct port scans as a legitimate function of their duties, an 
unauthorized port scan can indicate the beginning stages of a cyber-attack. 
a. Action 
To launch the port scan, we used the nmap port scanner. Nmap is a FOSS utility 
for network discovery and is an extremely popular and powerful port scanner. There are 
hundreds of custom scans that can be performed with nmap. For our scan, we executed the 
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following command: “nmap -sS -Pn 192.168.1.0/24” to scan the entire lab VLAN. The 
options after the nmap command were used to specify a custom scan. The -sS option 
performs a half-open TCP scan by sending only the first packet of the TCP three-way 
handshake. This type of scan is much stealthier than a scan that completes the three-way 
handshake such as the TCP connect scan. The -Pn option disables the default host discovery 
action, which consists of first pinging the target host before probing TCP ports. Because 
we did not specify any specific ports to scan, nmap chooses to scan its default port list of 
commonly used ports, which includes well-known services such as file transfer protocol 
(FTP), SSH, Windows server message block (SMB), hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), 
secure HTTP (HTTPS), and remote desktop protocol (RDP). Figure 31 is a screenshot of 
the nmap scan we executed and the output of the scan. Each port utilized in every attack 
scenario in this chapter is visible within the screenshot. 
67 
 
Figure 31. nmap scan 
The screenshot does not show the results of every machine in the lab VLAN, but 
what is shown is that the Windows Server 2012 R2 VM (192.168.1.100) is listening on 
several ports, such as SMB on TCP port 445 and RDP on TCP port 3389. Also shown is 
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the Basic Pentesting 1 VM (192.168.1.107) listening on FTP, SSH, and HTTP. These ports 
are typically of interest to an attacker as they may often be found hosting vulnerable 
services which can be exploited to gain remote access. 
b. Detection  
After we launched the port scan against the lab VLAN, the first indication that 
something abnormal was occurring was from the NIDS alert count visualization on the 
customized NHIDS dashboard. Thanks to the persistent setting to refresh the dashboard 
every minute, we quickly noticed the alert count climbing. As shown in Figure 32, the alert 
count in this visualization drastically skyrocketed from 14 alerts at 15:05 to 68 alerts at 
15:15, then down to four alerts at 15:20. This should be significant enough to prompt an 
analyst to investigate.  
 
Figure 32. NHIDS-Alert Over Time 
Our next step was to check “NHIDS—Alerts” for a possible high number of alerts. 
The alerts table shown in Figure 33 shows a high volume of traffic originating from a single 
IP address (192.168.1.101) and going to multiple IP addresses and ports. All activity is 
highly concentrated over a period spanning a total of 30 minutes. This is an indication of 
possible network scanning. 
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Figure 33. NIDS—Alerts 
Further analysis of one of the NIDS alerts (timestamp of 15:26:54.229) shows that 
it was classified as “Detection of a Network Scan” with the message “[1:2001972:19] ET 
SCAN Behavioral Unusually fast Terminal Server Traffic Potential Scan or Infection 
(Inbound) [Classification: Detection of a Network Scan] [Priority: 3]: <seconion-ens192> 
{TCP} 192.168.1.101:59091 -> 192.168.1.104:3389.” More succinctly stated, a network 
scan has been detected, originating from IP address 192.168.1.101 (Kali Linux host) and 
TCP port 59091, and destined to IP address 192.168.1.104 (Windows 7 host) and TCP port 
3389 (RDP). More information on this alert can be seen in Figure 34. This alert resulted 
from a Snort signature marked as “emerging threats” rule-type with priority 3. 
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Figure 34. Extended NIDS—Alert on Port Scan Activity 
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Next, we clicked on the NIDS Alert ID hyperlink. The CapMe page displayed with 
more information on the alert. A link provided at the top and bottom of the page, as shown 
in Figure 35, allowed for the download of the corresponding pcap in Figure 36. 
 
Figure 35. Port Scan CAPME 
 
Figure 36. Port Scan Pcap 
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Next, we switched to the “Bro Notice” dashboard to see if Bro detected some 
network anomalies. There was one notice in the “Notice—Log Count” panel. Scrolling 
down the page, the same Kali Linux host IP was listed as source and 192.168.1.109 
(Ubuntu host) as destination. The notice type was listed as “Scan::Port_Scan” and Bro 
Message/Sub-Message listed the following: “192.168.1.101 scanned at least 18 unique 
ports of host 192.168.1.109 in 1m4s.” Figure 37 shows this message. 
 
Figure 37. Bro Notice Message 
2. Online Password Cracking Attack 
The next malicious cyber activity we conducted was an online password cracking 
attack. We began by utilizing information we gathered from our port scan. The port scan 
showed the Windows 7 Pro VM was listening on TCP port 3389 for RDP connections. 
RDP can be abused by an attacker to gain control of a remote machine; but for this to be 
successful, the attacker would need valid account credentials for the machine hosting RDP. 
One method of acquiring valid credentials is via an online password cracking attack. 
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a. Action 
Hydra is a powerful online password-cracking tool for many protocols including 
RDP. We used Hydra from our Kali Linux VM to attempt to authenticate to RDP on the 
Windows 7 Pro VM. In conducting this attack, we attempted to authenticate as 
administrator using passwords from a password list included in Kali. As illustrated in 
Figure 38, the command we executed to launch this attack is “hydra -V -t8 -l Administrator 
-P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://192.168.1.104.” 
 
Figure 38. Online Password Cracking Attempt with Hydra 
The -V option instructed Hydra to run in verbose mode, so we could see the login 
and password combination during each authentication attempt. The -t8 option instructed 
Hydra to make 8 authentication attempts in parallel, speeding up our attack somewhat. We 
specified our username as administrator with the -l option, and then specified the full path 
of the password list with the -P option. Finally, we specified the protocol of RDP and the 
IP address of our Windows 7 Pro VM in order to complete our command and launch the 
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attack. Because we made a strong password when we created the Windows 7 Pro VM, 
Hydra was unsuccessful in guessing the password for the administrator account. The 
massive number of failed authentication attempts; however, generated alerts that were 
identifiable in Kibana. 
b. Detection 
Similar to our observation in the port scan activity, the first indication of the 
occurrence of abnormal activity was a spike in the number of alerts on the “NIDS—Alert 
Over Time visualization.” NIDS alerts rose from 2 to 900 counts between the time of 13:00 
and 13:13: the time span corresponding to execution of Hydra. A look at the NIDS alerts 
reflected in Figure 39, showed multiple connection attempts originating from the Kali 
Linux host IP address 192.168.1.101 (attacker) on TCP port 38978, to the Windows 7 host 
IP address 192.168.1.104 (victim) on TCP port 3389 (RDP). Also observable in Figure 39 
are instances where the victim acknowledges the connection request. 
 
Figure 39. NIDS—Alert on Password Cracking Attack 
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Further analysis of the alerts with timestamp August 1st 2018, 13:01:21.107 
indicates that an attempt to remotely connect to a terminal server with root (administrator) 
priviledge resulted in the generation of the alerts. It also indicated that the alerts were 
generated based on a Snort emerging threat rule type with priority 3, and policy based on 
access to Microsoft terminal server with root login. Clicking on the link at signature_info 
took us to the specific emergingthreat.net page where the signature is available for review. 
In addition to the signature, metadata is available showing when it was first created, and 
last updated. Also available on the website was the referenced Common Vulnerability and 
Eposure (CVE) number: 2001–0540. We then browsed to the CVE website hosted by Mitre 
where a search for the aforementioned CVE number yielded the following result: “Memory 
leak in Terminal servers in Windows NT and Windows 2000 allows remote attackers to 
cause a denial of service (memory exhaustion) via a large number of malformed Remote 
Desktop Protocol (RDP) requests to port 3389” [33]. Figure 40 provides an image capture 
of the described alert. 
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Figure 40. Extended NIDS - Alert Showing RDP Attempted Connection 
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Following our preliminary analysis, we wanted to determine if Bro had noticed a 
change in the network behavior, and if any alerts were generated by it. Our preliminary 
analysis already indicated that the attacker was attempting to establish RDP connections 
on port 3389. Such information was very handy as Kibana came equipped with Bro hunting 
dashboards for several well known protocols. Under “Bro Hunting” on the Navigation 
panel, we clicked on the “RDP” dashboard depicted in Figure 41. Bro indicated the 
existence of 846 attempted RDP connections within 80 minutes. The “RDP—Log Count 
Over Time” visualization also showed an increase in the log count averaging at 16 
connection attempts per minute. The “RDP—Result (Horizontal Bar Chart)” visualization 
reflected a 100 percent success rate in every attempt by the attacker to make a connection. 
The “RDP—Encryption Level (Vertical Bar Chart) showed that all 846 connections were 
encrypted. In the “RDP-Client” visualization, The name of the tool used (Hydra) in 
perpetrating the attack was detected in 841 logs and listed. The “RDP—Cookie” 
visualization lists one account name—”cookie”—against which the password attacks had 
been conducted. There were 845 instances against the account name “administrator” 
recorded. Further down these visualizations is a table list of Bro logs. The expansion of 
one of the logs indicated that, in addition to the information already gathered, that a 128bit-
encryption method was used during the connection.  
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Figure 41. Bro Hunting RDP 
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At this point, one could say that it is quite evident based on the information already 
gathered that some sort of RDP connection attack had occurred, involving a privileged user 
account. Though this would be alarming enough, we still had questions for which we 
needed answers. From our preliminary analysis, we determined that the RDP connections 
between the attacker and the victim were successful. For a more in-depth analysis, we 
clicked on the Bro_rpd log ID to access the CapME. This is shown in Figure 42. The stream 
following the highlighted portion of the log entry contains relevant information that 
answers the question of how Bro detected the tool by name. The first SRC line shows the 
Cookie information. Also visible (four lines down) is a mention of the password cracking 
tool name Hydra in the stream. 
 
Figure 42. Password Cracking Attack CapME  
We also downloaded the PCAP from both the Bro logged activity and the NIDS 
alerts. As stated earlier, the connections were encrypted. Though we were able to find some 
clues, we could not establish logon activity using PCAPs, such as the one in Figure 43. To 
put our curiosity to rest, we queried all OSSEC alerts generated within the time frame of 
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the attack and searched for instances where the username “administrator” successfully 
logged into the victim. Our query returned no result; thus, confirming that the attack, 
though recorded, was ultimately unsuccessful.  
 
Figure 43. Password Cracking Attack PCAP 
3. Web Server Attack 
The third malicious cyber action we conducted was against the Web server running 
on the Basic Pentesting 1 host (hereon referred to as BP1 for brevity). We knew from our 
port scan that BP1 was listening on port 80 therefore was likely hosting a website. Attackers 
often attack web servers to attempt to gain initial access into a network. For this reason, it 




To be certain BP1 was hosting web content on port 80, we browsed to it via Firefox 
from the Kali VM, and received the default webpage served by the Apache web server. 
Next, we scanned the website with the web server security scanner Nikto. As described on 
the Nikto homepage, Nikto performs a comprehensive security test against webservers 
looking for server versions, multiple index files, and vulnerabilities [34]. Figure 44 shows 
some interesting output from the Nikto scan we performed. 
 
Figure 44. Nikto Scan Results 
Highlighted in Figure 44 is information about another directory hosted on the 
webserver called “secret.” Using our web browser on our Kali VM we browsed to the 
newly discovered directory and discovered a WordPress webpage. WordPress is a web 
content management framework commonly used in blogs, forums, and other websites. We 
decided to scan the WordPress webpage with WPScan to attempt to look for potentially 
exploitable vulnerabilities. WPScan is a powerful WordPress vulnerability scanner and is 
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installed by default on Kali. We first ran WPScan with the “--enumerate” option to attempt 
all enumeration methods; including searching for usernames, vulnerable plugins, and 
vulnerable themes. The command we used to execute this scan was “wpscan --url 
http://192.168.1.107/secret --enumerate.” As illustrated in Figure 45, we did not find 
vulnerable plugins or themes, but we did discover the default username of “admin.” 
 
Figure 45. WPScan Enumeration 
We ran WPScan again to perform an online password-cracking attempt with the 
“admin” username and a wordlist included with Kali. The command we used to execute 
this was “wpscan --url http://192.168.1.107/secret --username admin --wordlist /usr/share/
wordlists/fasttrack.txt.” As illustrated in Figure 46, WPScan detected an unknown response 
when trying “admin” for the username and password. Although getting an unknown 
response was slightly unexpected, it does indicate that the username and password of 
“admin” successfully authenticated with the WordPress webpage. This is not surprising as 
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“admin” is the default username and password for WordPress websites. Changing default 
credentials is a step often overlooked or forgotten by less experienced administrators. 
 
Figure 46. WPScan Password Enumeration 
After we discovered the username and password for the WordPress webpage, we 
were able to use Metasploit to gain remote access to the BP1 VM and acquire a Meterpreter 
session. The Metasploit Meterpreter is an advanced memory resident payload included in 
the Metasploit Framework that offers more power to an attacker than a traditional remote 
shell. Figures 47 and 48 show both the command used to launch the exploit, and evidence 
of the acquired Meterpreter shell. 
 
Figure 47. Metasploit Exploit 
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Figure 48. Meterpreter Session 
From our WordPress exploit, we gained access to BP1 as the user “www-data.” 
This would give us—in the role of attacker—the ability to perform various malicious 
activities. If we wanted root level access for full control of BP1, we would need to 
successfully attempt privilege escalation. It is likely however, that further activity would 
be thwarted as much of our malicious activity thus far has been logged in the SIEM. 
b. Detection 
When we browsed to BP1’s webpage as an initial reconnaissance phase of this 
attack, no alerts were generated as nothing malicious had been done. However, as seen by 
previous scans, there was a sharp increase in alerts immediately following the Nikto scan 
as shown in Figure 49. The rate of alerts over time increased from two per minute, to 1,326 
alerts per minute, within four minutes. 
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Figure 49. NIDS—Alert on Web Server Attack 
A look at the “NIDS—Alerts” panel indicated numerous potentially malicious 
traffic originating from the Kali Linux host (attacker), and destined to the BP1 host on port 
80. The following alerts of interest for traffic destined to port 80 on the victim were also 
generated by Suricata during this attack: 
The earliest alert associated with this activity was a priority “1” alert with 
timestamp “August 4th 2018, 12:02:11.357.” The alert name was “ET SCAN Nikto Web 
App Scan in Progress” originating from the Kali VM to the BP1 VM. Over the next 15 
seconds, there were 1,326 total alerts from the Kali VM to the BP1 VM on TCP port 80, 
after which no alerts were generated for several minutes. This suggests the Nikto scan 
lasted approximately 15 seconds. Some of the 1,326 alerts are as follows: 
• ET WEB_SERVER Possible CVE-2014-6271 Attempt in Headers 
• ET POLICY Proxy TRACE Request—inbound 
• GPL WEB_SERVER .htaccess access 
After several minutes, another alert spike appeared that was associated with the 
Kali VM and the BP1 VM. The first alert associated with this traffic was a priority “1” 
alert named “ET WEB_SERVER WPScan User Agent.” This alert was classified as “Web 
Application Attack” and had a timestamp of “August 4th 2018, 12:14:09.365.” This was a 
clear indicator that the WPScan tool was scanning the webserver on BP1. Over the next 70 
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seconds, there were 474 alerts associated with the Kali VM and the BP1 VM followed by 
another few minutes of silence. This shows the WPScan took roughly 70 seconds to 
complete. Several of the 474 alerts were named “ET WEB_SERVER Wordpress Login 
Bruteforcing Detected” which shows that the scan attempted to guess the login name. 
After another several minutes, several new alerts were generated. The first alert was 
named “ET WEB_SERVER Wordpress Login Bruteforcing Detected” had a timestamp of 
“August 4th 2018, 12:21:11.262.” Over the next 6 seconds, 445 additional alerts were 
generated for “ET POLICY Http Client Body contains pwd= in cleartext” after which there 
was another period of silence. Further PCAP analysis indicated the attempt to access 
numerous web pages with the word “secret” in the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This 
obviously was a password guessing attack against the /secret/ directory hosted on the 
webserver. 
The exploitation of the webserver with Metasploit and the subsequently acquired 
Meterpreter shell was much harder to find. One reason is that credentials had already been 
acquired so the attacker was able to authenticate with WordPress to upload the Meterpreter. 
There were no noticeable spikes in the alerts when this attack was conducted. This was an 
attack that could only be detected by meticulously analyzing every single generated alert—
something a good analyst would do once all the previously generated alerts were noticed. 
There were 24 alerts generated for this attack, each of which were categorized as one of 
the following: 
• ET INFO GENERIC SUSPICIOUS POST to Dotted Quad with Fake 
Browser 1 
• ET POLICY Cleartext WordPress Login 
• ET POLICY Http Client Body contains pass= in cleartext 
• ET WEB_SERVER PHP tags in HTTP POST 
Further analysis of the PCAP associated with the “ET WEB_SERVER PHP tags in 
HTTP POST” alert indicated that the attacker was able to successfully install a WordPress 
plugin on the BP1 web server. This can be seen in Figure 50 as the BP1 web server returned 
an “HTTP/1.1 200 OK” response when the attacker uploaded the plugin. The installation 
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of WordPress plugin should be alarming to an analyst as plugins can be malicious—and in 
this case, it was the Meterpreter payload. 
 
Figure 50. Metasploit Meterpreter Login Attack 
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4. Windows Server Exploitation 
For our last malicious cyber action, we focused on the Windows Server 2012 R2 
Domain Controller. Our initial port scan showed several open ports including TCP ports 
445 (SMB) and 88 (Kerberos). These two open ports strongly suggest the host is a Domain 
Controller (DC). 
a. Action 
Acting in our role as the attacker, we did not know exactly what version of 
Windows the DC was running. To Determine the Windows version, we conducted an SMB 
version scan using Metasploit. It is common to find SMB traffic in a network with 
Windows machines, so we expected this scan would not likely “flag” as anything abnormal 
or malicious. Figure 51 shows that the SMB Version scan detected the host to be running 
Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard. 
 
Figure 51. SMB Version Scan 
An experienced attacker would recognize that this specific OS, when unpatched, 
is vulnerable to MS17_010. Microsoft states that the MS17-010 vulnerability “could 
allow remote code execution if an attacker sends specially crafted messages to a 
Microsoft Server Message Block 1.0 (SMBv1) server” [35]. According to Rapid7 who 
manages the Metasploit project, Metasploit includes both a vulnerability scan and a 
remote exploit for MS17_010, which it refers to as EternalBlue [36]. As demonstrated in 
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Figure 52, we used the vulnerability scan to confirm that we could exploit the MS17_010 
vulnerability to gain remote access to the DC. 
 
Figure 52. MS17_010 Vulnerability Scan 
 Next, as demonstrated in Figure 53, we used the EternalBlue exploit in Metasploit 
to upload the Meterpreter payload to the DC and acquire a remote session. 
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Figure 53. EternalBlue Exploit 
The exploit was successful, and we now had remote access to the DC. Our last step 
in the attack was to install Meterpreter as a Windows service to ensure persistent access to 
the DC. This would allow us to reacquire a Meterpreter session to the DC at any point in 
the future, without needing to re-exploit. To achieve this method of persistence, we 
executed “run metsvc” from our Meterpreter session, which ran the Meterpreter service 
installation script. Figure 54 shows our persistent Meterpreter service installing and being 
set to listen on TCP port 31337 for any future connections. 
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Figure 54. Meterpreter Service Installation 
b. Detection 
Unlike previously conducted scans on the network, the scan conducted to determine 
the SMB version of the Windows Server scan, using Metasploit, did not result in the 
generation of many alerts. The alert count visualization was consistent with “normal” 
traffic. As we looked through the generated NIDS alerts, we noticed two alerts generated 
(shown in Figure 55) that were based on traffic that originated from the Kali Linux host 
(attacker) and sent to port 445 on IP address 192.168.1.100 (the Windows Server 2012 R2 
victim). These two alerts were assigned priority “3” level, were named “GPL NETBIOS 
SMB-DS IPC$ share access” and had the same timestamps. 
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Figure 55. NIDS—Alert on SMB Version Scan 
Next, we looked for any indication of EternalBlue vulnerability scanning event. 
Once again, there was no major increase in the alert generation. Like the SMB version 
scan, the MS17_010 scan generated two alerts with the same priority and same name. 
Differentiating between these two events would be very difficult as the alerts were 
identical. We were; however, able to tell the two events apart using their timestamps. As 
visible in Figure 56, alerts generated for the SMB version scan occurred at timestamp 
“August 5th 2018, 12:41:39.408,” while alerts for the MS17_010 vulnerability scan were 
generated with timestamp “August 5th 2018, 12:57:51.666.” 
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Figure 56. NIDS—Alert on EternalBlue Vulnerability Scan 
Following the two alerts generated for the vulnerability scan, were 24 NIDS alerts 
for the EternalBlue exploit launched with Meterpreter payload. This began with four alerts 
similar to the ones recorded for the previous two scans. Then there were 20 alerts pertaining 
to a connection between the Kali VM and the DC. These 20 alerts showed the DC 
connected from an ephemeral port to the Kali VM on port 4444. A connection between two 
hosts on high numbered ports can be suspicious. An experienced analyst would recognize 
that port 4444 is a default connection port for Metasploit exploits. Figure 57 is a screenshot 
of the alerts relating to the EternalBlue exploit and Meterpreter session between the 
attacker and victim. 
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Figure 57. NIDS—Alert EternalBlue Exploit with Meterpreter Payload 
Expanding the alert with timestamp “August 5th 2018, 13:32:36.293,” by clicking 
on the arrow to the left, indicated a priority “1” alert with name “ET POLICY PE EXE or 
DLL Windows file download” as shown in Figure 58. From this alert, we can assess that 
an EXE or DLL file was uploaded to the victim. Providing even more evidence for the 
upload of an executable payload, when we looked at the PCAP for this activity, we could 
see text strings for the sections in a portable executable (PE) file header. More 




Figure 58. Extended NIDS—Alerts for EternalBlue Exploit with 
Meterpreter Payload 
We also saw indications of another connection between the Kali VM and the DC. 
The “Bro Connection” dashboard indicated that there were 22 connections to the victim IP 
96 
address on port 31337. Seeing the attacker create a second connection to the victim is 
consistent with an attacker establishing an improved (more stable or more permanent) 
session. When analyzing the HIDS alerts for indications of compromise, we discovered the 
existence of one OSSEC alert classified as “User generated error” and described as 
“Windows error event.” The alert described this error as “The Meterpreter service is 
marked as an interactive service. However, the system is configured to not allow interactive 
services. This service may not function properly.” This alert shows that the attacker 
attempted to install Meterpreter as a service, but the DC was configured to not allow 




Figure 59. OSSEC—Alert on Meterpreter Rootkit Install 
B. FALSE POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES 
During the course of this study, we experienced many false positive and some false 
negative alerts. During the configuration and testing of the lab environment, we had to fine-
tune the level of alerts we wanted Kibana to display. The NIDS and HIDS generated alerts 
according to downloaded signatures. However, we had the ability to control the type of 
alerts we wished to see in the custom NHIDS dashboard that we created. For example, we 
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initially configured the NHIDS dashboard to only display priority 1 and 2 alerts. However, 
we noticed during the port scan that alerts on generic Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP) events and network scans, which where priority 3, were not being displayed. 
Following this discovery, we decided to change our configuration to display alerts with 
priorities 1 thru 3. We frequently checked the pre-configured dashboards to be certain our 
custom NHIDS dashboard did not overlook any important alerts, and confirmed none were 
missed. The great thing about using the Lucene query language was that we could easily 
shrink the level of alerts that we wanted displayed by simply changing the priority range. 
The HIDS alerts had a higher ratio of false positives as compared to the NIDS alerts. Even 
though we could have further constrained the alert level range (e.g., from 1–3 to 1–2) in 
order to reduce the number of false positives displayed, we wanted to see successful/
authorized events which is prioritized as a level 3 alerts. This was necessary in order to 
monitor user logon events which can be helpful for detecting and investigating password 
cracking activities. Despite all the extra—non-malicious—logon alerts displayed, we 
deemed this a worthwhile tradeoff for the ability to better discern attacker activities. 
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VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
Identifying malicious cyber activity can be tedious and time consuming. Large 
heterogeneous networks without central logging can make timely detection and analysis 
nearly impossible. The ability to aggregate and normalize logs is critical to the cyber 
defender’s goal of quickly detecting and correlating malicious cyber activity. A SIEM can 
perform these aggregation and normalization functions on logs collected from many 
sources, and provide this rich collection of event-related information to analysts via a 
searchable interface. This enables analysts to provide more timely and informed incident 
response. 
There are many different SIEM solutions available both commercially and as 
FOSS. The intent of this capstone was to identify a FOSS SIEM capable of benefiting the 
Navy’s defensive cyber capabilities. We evaluated three popular FOSS SIEMs—Prelude’s 
Universal Open-Source SIEM project, AlienVault’s Open Source Security Information and 
Event Management (OSSIM), and Elasticsearch Logstash and Kibana (ELK) by Elastic. 
We chose ELK for this capstone because of the vast amount of documentation available 
and its robust performance. 
We designed and architected a testbed network and deployed the ELK SIEM to 
evaluate its utility in improving cyber defense. Utilizing several blade servers, we designed 
a lab network consisting of Linux and Windows virtual machines running in VMWare 
ESXi. We installed ELK via the Security Onion Linux distribution to aggregate, normalize, 
and correlate logs from the machines on our testbed network. We also configured ELK to 
passively capture all network traffic within our lab VLAN. Using OSSEC we added HIDS 
to our virtual machines and ingested the HIDS logs into ELK. 
Using Kali Linux, we performed several malicious cyber actions and evaluated 
ELK’s usefulness in identifying and correlating the malicious activity. We began this 
malicious activity with a port scan, followed by an online password cracking attack against 
RDP. We continued with an attack against a WordPress website, and finished with an 
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exploit against our domain controller. We discovered that with ELK, we were able to 
readily identify each of the various malicious cyber actions via ELK-provided dashboard 
alerts. ELK provided an intuitive interface that enabled us to deeply analyze the 
characteristics of the malicious activity, while also more easily discern any false positive 
alerts. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this capstone was to document the research conducted in choosing 
ELK; the actions taken to install and configure ELK in a suitable analysis environment; 
and to evaluate ELK’s effectiveness via the execution of offensive activities on the ELK-
defended network. We did not have a great deal of hands-on experience with ELK or any 
FOSS SIEM prior to beginning this research. Our appreciation for ELK was not fully 
realized until we saw how well it captured our malicious cyber activity. Though we 
anticipated that ELK would allow us to see some of the malicious activity we generated; 
ELK greatly exceeded even those expectations. Using ELK, we were able to detect 
virtually every single malicious action, and to view activity-related information that 
provided surprising detail. 
The countless hours we spent on this capstone have enabled us to better understand 
the power behind ELK and how the Navy could use ELK (or similarly capable FOSS) to 
increase its cyber warfighting capabilities. We were impressed by the ability of ELK to 
provide us with detailed threat and incident-related intelligence in a relatively simple and 
intuitive interface. Using ELK, an analyst can not only monitor the cyber activity of 
malicious actors, but do so with a level of efficiency that would shorten the incident 
response detection-to-remediation life cycle. 
ELK’s ability to not only present important information about individual events, 
but to correlate multiple related events into actionable intelligence, makes it a force 
multiplier for network defense. As a FOSS product, ELK could be incorporated into the 
Navy’s arsenal with no added materiel cost. Based on our research, we assert that ELK is 
a mission-ready solution, provides an indispensable capability, and could immediately 
improve the Navy’s cyber warfighting abilities. 
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C. FUTURE WORK 
This capstone focused on the selection and configuration of a FOSS SIEM and 
testing its effectiveness in aggregating, normalizing, and correlating data in a typical 
network environment. In doing so, the cyber-attacks and incident detection analysis 
conducted during our study demonstrated that ELK, when properly configured and fed with 
necessary log data, can aid cyber security analysts in the detection of malicious and 
unauthorized activities on their networks. Hereof, we submit the following 
recommendations for future work. 
• Test the ELK SIEM (or similar FOSS SIEM) in a Consolidated Afloat Network 
and Enterprise Services (CANES) environment. Deploying ELK in an authentic 
shipboard network architecture would more reliably demonstrate the 
capabilities ELK brings to the Navy. 
• Include a router in the network architecture. The introduction of router logs into 
ELK that hold pertinent information such as dropped packets, established 
connections, and numerous logs that resulted from the access control list 
implementation, would provide another dimension of useful information to a 
network defender. 
• Configure ELK to receive logs from the switch. Logs obtained from switches 
can provide indication of VLAN based attacks, MAC flooding, and Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing. 
• Conduct attacks from outside the perimeter of the lab VLAN. Attacks 
conducted from outside the network perimeter will demonstrate ELK’s ability 
to correlate logs from perimeter control devices. 
• Configure Suricata as an inline IPS. In this capstone, Suricata was configured 
as an IDS and passively sniffed traffic. Given the number of alerts generated 
during the attack/detection phase, it would be useful to evaluate how well 
Suricata, if configured for inline prevention, would block malicious traffic and 
to observe how the associated logs would appear in Kibana. 
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• Configure and deploy user-defined Snort signatures. In the case of a zero-day 
attack for which no signature exists, creating and applying signatures in a timely 
manner can help detect ongoing activities. Demonstrating how user-defined 
Snort signatures appear in Kibana would be useful to a network defender. 
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APPENDIX A. SNORT PRIORITIES 
Table 11. Snort Default Classifications. Source: [37]. 
Class Type Description Priority 
attempted-admin Attempted Administrator 
Privilege Gain 
high 
attempted-user Attempted User Privilege 
Gain 
high 
inappropriate-content Inappropriate Content was 
Detected 
high 
policy-violation Potential Corporate Privacy 
Violation 
high 
shellcode-detect Executable code was detected high 
successful-admin Successful Administrator 
Privilege Gain 
high 
successful-user Successful User Privilege 
Gain 
high 
trojan-activity A Network Trojan was 
detected 
high 
unsuccessful-user Unsuccessful User Privilege 
Gain 
high 
web-application-attack Web Application Attack high 
attempted-dos Attempted Denial of Service medium 
attempted-recon Attempted Information Leak medium 
bad-unknown Potentially Bad Traffic medium 
default-login-attempt Attempt to login by a default 
username and password 
medium 
denial-of-service Detection of a Denial of 
Service Attack 
medium 
misc-attack Misc Attack medium 
non-standard-protocol Detection of a non-standard 
protocol or event 
medium 
rpc-portmap-decode Decode of an RPC Query medium 
successful-dos Denial of Service medium 
successful-recon-largescale Large Scale Information Leak medium 
successful-recon-limited Information Leak medium 
suspicious-filename-detect A suspicious filename was 
detected 
medium 
suspicious-login An attempted login using a 
suspicious username was 
detected 
medium 
system-call-detect A system call was detected medium 
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Class Type Description Priority 
unusual-client-port-connection A client was using an unusual 
port 
medium 
web-application-activity Access to a potentially 
vulnerable web application 
medium 
icmp-event Generic ICMP event low 
misc-activity Misc activity low 
network-scan Detection of a Network Scan low 
not-suspicious Not Suspicious Traffic low 
protocol-command-decode Generic Protocol Command 
Decode 
low 
string-detect A suspicious string was 
detected 
low 
unknown Unknown Traffic low 






APPENDIX B. OSSEC RULE CLASSIFICATION LEVELS 
Obtained from [38]. 
Rules Classification 
The rules are classified in multiple levels. From the lowest (00) to the maximum 
level 16. Some levels are not used right now. Other levels can be added between 
them or after them. 
The rules will be read from the highest to the lowest level. 
00—Ignored—No action taken. Used to avoid false positives. These rules are 
scanned before all the others. They include events with no security relevance. 
01—None - 
02—System low priority notification—System notification or status messages. 
They have no security relevance. 
03—Successful/Authorized events—They include successful login attempts, 
firewall allow events, etc. 
04—System low priority error—Errors related to bad configurations or unused 
devices/applications. They have no security relevance and are usually caused by 
default installations or software testing. 
05—User generated error—They include missed passwords, denied actions, etc. 
By itself they have no security relevance. 
06—Low relevance attack—They indicate a worm or a virus that have no effect 
to the system (like code red for apache servers, etc.). They also include frequently 
IDS events and frequently errors. 
07—”Bad word” matching. They include words like “bad,” “error,” etc. These 
events are most of the time unclassified and may have some security relevance. 
08—First time seen—Include first time seen events. First time an IDS event is 
fired or the first time a user logged in. If you just started using OSSEC HIDS these 
messages will probably be frequently. After a while they should go away, it also 
includes security relevant actions (like the starting of a sniffer or something like 
that). 
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09—Error from invalid source—Include attempts to login as an unknown user or 
from an invalid source. May have security relevance (especially if repeated). They 
also include errors regarding the “admin” (root) account. 
10—Multiple user generated errors—They include multiple bad passwords, 
multiple failed logins, etc. They may indicate an attack or may just be that a user 
just forgot his credentials. 
11—Integrity checking warning—They include messages regarding the 
modification of binaries or the presence of rootkits (by rootcheck). If you just 
modified your system configuration you should be fine regarding the “syscheck” 
messages. They may indicate a successful attack. Also included IDS events that 
will be ignored (high number of repetitions). 
12—High importance event—They include error or warning messages from the 
system, kernel, etc. They may indicate an attack against a specific application. 
13—Unusual error (high importance)—Most of the times it matches a common 
attack pattern. 
14—High importance security event. Most of the times done with correlation and 
it indicates an attack. 
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